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Presidential Factfinding 
Shalev Roisman* 
The modern President possesses enormous power. She can use 
military force abroad without congressional authorization, impose 
economic sanctions on foreign powers, or enter into trade agreements 
with foreign states. She can do all this on her own, with little constraint. 
Or so it seems. In reality, these important powers, along with numerous 
more mundane ones, are all contingent on the President first making 
certain factual determinations. For example, to use force abroad, the 
President must first determine that the use of force is in the “national 
interest,” perhaps that it will preserve “regional stability” or protect 
American lives. To impose sanctions, she might have to determine that 
a country has used chemical weapons against its own people. To remove 
an officer with for-cause protection, she must find that there was “cause,” 
such as “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance.” Given that the 
President can only invoke these powers—and many, many others—when 
certain facts exist, the process and standard of certainty the President 
uses to find such facts can have enormous consequences. The 
phenomenon of presidential factfinding is thus both commonplace and 
important. It is also almost entirely unstudied.  
This Article establishes the importance of factfinding as a 
pervasive feature of presidential power spanning constitutional, 
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statutory, and international law. The Article then examines the 
President’s existing obligations in conducting factfinding, arguing that 
the President has a constitutional duty to act, at the least, honestly and 
based on reasonable inquiry. Finally, it addresses how presidential 
factfinding ought to be structured and regulated internally within the 
executive branch, by Congress, and through judicial review.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The President is a factfinder. We do not typically think of her in 
that way, but it’s true. In a wide array of areas, before the President 
can exercise power, she must first find certain facts. Take a few 
examples: 
• To use military force abroad without congressional 
authorization, the President must find that such force would 
promote important “national interests,” such as saving 
American lives abroad or preserving “regional stability.”1  
• To impose certain sanctions on foreign states, the President 
must find that the state has used “chemical or biological 
weapons against its own nationals.”2  
• To enter into certain trade agreements, the President must 
first conclude that foreign duties are “unduly burdening and 
restricting the foreign trade of the United States” and that 
the agreements will promote particular “purposes, policies, 
priorities, and objectives” dictated by Congress.3  
• To bar the entry of certain classes of aliens into the country, 
the President must first find that their entry would be 
“detrimental to the interests of the United States.”4  
• To remove an officer with “for cause” removal protection, the 
President must find that there was “cause,” such as 
“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance.”5 
These powers are far from unique. To the contrary, presidential 
power contingent on finding certain facts is a truly pervasive feature of 
constitutional, statutory, and international law. And given that 
presidents can only invoke these powers upon finding certain facts, the 
process and standard of certainty the President uses to find such facts 
can have enormous consequences. Presidential factfinding is thus both 
commonplace and important. Yet, it is also almost entirely unstudied.  
 
 1. See, e.g., Auth. to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C., 2011 WL 1459998, at *10 
(2011); Curtis A. Bradley & Jean Galbraith, Presidential War Powers as an Interactive Dynamic: 
International Law, Domestic Law, and Practice-Based Legal Change, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 689, 756 
(2016).  
 2. 22 U.S.C. § 5604(a) (2012). 
 3. 19 U.S.C. § 4202 (2012).  
 4. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012). 
 5. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.§ 1202 (2012) (“Any member [of the Merit Systems Protection Board] 
may be removed by the President only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”); 
Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 
98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 786 (2013) (listing agency officials with statutory removal protection). 
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This Article seeks to change that. In doing so, it seeks to identify 
and help fill a gap in the literature and doctrine regarding presidential 
power. In many ways, the study of presidential power has largely been 
a study of its outer bounds and limits. This examination has often 
focused on determining which facts, if any, authorize the President to 
act. May the President seize certain steel mills, if such seizure is 
necessary to avert an emergency in the war-fighting effort?6 May the 
President use military force abroad not only to protect American lives, 
but also to preserve regional stability, or even prevent humanitarian 
disasters?7 Does the 2001 congressional authorization to use force 
against al Qaeda include the power to use force against groups that 
merely “significantly support” al Qaeda, or is it limited to groups that 
actively fight alongside al Qaeda against the United States?8 And so on. 
In many ways, a core part of public law scholarship and doctrine 
relating to presidential power has been about which facts authorize the 
President to exert power.9 But after one determines which facts 
authorize the President to act, key questions remain: How must and 
how should the President go about finding these facts? To date, we have 
not asked or answered these questions in any systematic way.10 This 
Article seeks to do just that.  
 
 6. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 7. See, e.g., CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 658–60 (6th ed. 2017) (remarking that “[t]here is general agreement that . . . the 
President has the power to repel attacks on the United States” and “to use force to protect the lives 
and property of U.S. citizens abroad”); id. at 664 (questioning whether “prevent[ing] a 
humanitarian catastrophe” or “preserving regional stability” and “supporting the U.N. Security 
Council’s credibility and effectiveness” are the types of “national interests” that warrant unilateral 
presidential uses of force). 
 8. See Rebecca Ingber, Co-Belligerency, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 67, 85 (2017); see also Curtis A. 
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 2047, 2109 (2005) (discussing the scope of 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force). 
 9. An alternative line of recent scholarship focuses on the structure of executive branch legal 
decisionmaking, providing valuable work on how the President determines and ought to determine 
what the law is. E.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007); Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (2010); Daphna Renan, The Law Presidents Make, 103 VA. L. REV. 805 
(2017). But once one determines what the law is, one must apply it to the facts. And facts must be 
found. 
 10. Some recent scholarship has certainly touched on presidential factfinding. The most 
relevant scholarship has focused exclusively on judicial deference to factfinding, specifically in the 
national security area. See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 1361 (2009); Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Military 
Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2005). Kevin Stack perhaps comes the closest to answering how 
presidential factfinding ought to be reviewed by courts across subject-matter domains, but he does 
not address the President’s first-order legal obligations in finding facts, does not focus on 
factfinding in particular (as opposed to all questions of law, fact, and mixed fact and law), and 
excludes from his analysis constitutional exercises of authority, which frequently contain 
factfinding obligations. See Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the President’s Statutory Powers, 
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Indeed, despite the lack of focus on these questions, answering 
them is extremely important. As we know from numerous areas of law, 
a factfinder’s decision often hinges on the process she uses to find 
relevant facts and the level of certainty she must have that those facts 
exist. This intuitive notion forms the basic premise of the study of civil 
procedure, criminal procedure, administrative law, and institutional 
design, to name a few examples.11 It has also been the driving force 
behind the scholarly project critiquing how Congress, courts, and, for a 
time, agencies found so-called “legislative facts” without any sort of 
standard or rigorous process.12 In fact, ensuring appropriate procedures 
for agency factfinding was one of the foundational concerns about the 
administrative state at its inception.13 Yet, conspicuously left out of this 
 
62 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1209 (2009) [hereinafter Stack, Reviewability]; see also Harold H. Bruff, 
Judicial Review and the President’s Statutory Powers, 68 VA. L. REV. 1 (1982) (focusing on judicial 
review of exercises of statutory authority affecting private rights but not focusing on factfinding); 
David M. Driesen, Judicial Review of Executive Orders’ Rationality, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1013, 1066 
(2018) (focusing on judicial review of statutory executive orders, but excluding constitutional 
authorities, and not focusing on factfinding). Matthew Waxman provides an interesting account of 
the President’s first-order factfinding obligations, but he does so with respect to the discrete 
questions under international law of when the executive can detain suspected enemy combatants 
or attack states suspected of having weapons of mass destruction. See Matthew C. Waxman, 
Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1365 (2008) [hereinafter Waxman, Detention]; Matthew C. Waxman, The Use of Force 
Against States That Might Have Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2009).  
 11. The consequential nature of procedure is well known. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. 
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971) (“[I]t is procedure that marks much of the difference 
between rule by law and rule by fiat.”); Regulatory Reform Act of 1983: Hearing on H.R. 2327 Before 
the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th 
Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. John Dingell) (“I’ll let you write the substance . . . you let me 
write the procedure, and I’ll screw you every time.”); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information 
Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1439 (2011) (noting familiar 
procedural ways in which institutional design is used to shape decisionmaking by public officials).  
 12. See, e.g., 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15:9 (2d ed. 1980) 
(critiquing and assessing judicial and agency legislative factfinding); DAVID L. FAIGMAN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS 3, 167 (2008) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s “failure to account for 
the empirical world” and arguing for a “coherent and consistent theory of constitutional fact-
finding”); Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary 
Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1170 (2001) (noting that “while Congress has superior factfinding 
capacities, it often lacks the institutional incentives to take factfinding seriously”); Brianne J. 
Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (2011) 
(noting judicial reliance on extrarecord facts that have not been thoroughly tested by the 
adversarial process); Allison Orr Larsen, Constitutional Law in an Age of Alternative Facts, 93 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 175 (2018) (noting ubiquity of factfinding as predicate for congressional statutes 
and judicial rulings and arguing for courts to apply a more rigorous process for finding legislative 
facts). 
 13. See DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES 
IN AMERICA, 1900–1940, at 3 (2014) (“The requirement of findings [of fact] may seem arcane. . . . 
Nonetheless, it is the key to understanding the twentieth century origins of the administrative 
state in America.”); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. 
REV. 718, 744 (2016) (reviewing ERNST, supra) (“[E]arly New Deal administration was marked by 
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scholarship critiquing how Congress, courts, and agencies find facts has 
been an exploration of how the President finds facts.14 Once we combine 
the pervasive nature of presidential factfinding with the well-known 
notion that how facts are found can be outcome-determinative, we can 
see how important the study of presidential factfinding is.15 Because the 
President’s power frequently hinges on finding certain facts, how the 
President goes about finding those facts can make the difference 
between her having power and lacking it. As a result, to truly 
understand the scope of the President’s power, we must understand not 
only which facts authorize her to act, but how she must and ought to go 
about finding them.16   
Part I begins by demonstrating the pervasive nature of 
factfinding as a feature of presidential power. Presidential factfinding 
powers—by which I mean powers that require the President to first find 
certain facts before exercising an authority or duty—span 
constitutional, statutory, and international law, and range from the 
hot-button to the mundane. Indeed, it is hard to find an area of 
presidential power that does not contain authorities contingent on the 
President finding certain facts. After establishing the phenomenon’s 
pervasiveness, the Article provides a taxonomy to explain how 
factfinding fits into presidential power. Presidential powers can be 
divided into what I call “Pure Fact,” “Mixed Fact and Policy,” and “Pure 
Discretion” powers. Factfinding forms a core part of Pure Fact and 
Mixed Fact and Policy powers, but not of Pure Discretion powers. As a 
result, the positive and normative analysis that follows applies to these 
first two categories but not the third.  
But what are the President’s positive legal obligations in finding 
facts before exercising authority?17 Based on conventional sources of 
 
two . . . worrisome signs — an absence of rigorous factfinding and almost limitless legislative 
delegations.”).  
 14. See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 931 (1980) 
(discussing legislative, judicial, and administrative—but not presidential—lawmaking reliant on 
factfinding). 
 15. Cf. 3 DAVIS, supra note 12, § 15:8, at 160 (“Hardly anything about law can be more 
fundamental than the facts that lawmakers use, the ways that lawmakers get their facts, and the 
procedures that lawmakers use for allowing affected persons to submit facts to lawmakers and to 
challenge facts that lawmakers are using.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Waxman, Detention, supra note 10, at 1381 (noting “analytic inextricability of 
the standard-of-certainty question and the substantive issue to be proven”); cf. John Calvin 
Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal 
Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1347 (1979) (same).  
 17. As noted supra note 10, scholars have not yet provided an account of the President’s first-
order legal obligations in how she finds facts. Neither have courts. Courts do not typically review 
instances of presidential factfinding because of a variety of standing, justiciability, and deference 
doctrines. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical 
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constitutional interpretation, including the Constitution’s text, 
structure, Supreme Court precedent, and historical practice, Part II 
argues that the President has a constitutional duty to be honest and 
engage in reasonable inquiry when finding facts that are predicates for 
exercising power. Although this duty may not seem overly onerous, it is 
not illusory. Such a duty renders the exercise of presidential power 
unconstitutional when the factfinding serving as a predicate for such 
authority is dishonest or conducted without at least minimal 
evidentiary support, reasonable process, or consideration of available 
and appropriate evidence. And unfortunately there are numerous 
examples of historic presidential factfinding that do not meet even these 
relatively modest standards.18  
Having set forth the descriptive scope of the phenomenon of 
presidential factfinding and the President’s existing obligations in 
finding facts, Part III turns to the question of how presidential 
factfinding ought to be regulated. First, it explores how the President 
does and ought to regulate presidential factfinding within the executive 
branch. This question is crucial because, unlike power exercised by 
agencies, the Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA”) requirements and 
judicial review provisions do not apply to the President.19 And 
 
Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (2013) (“A variety of justiciability 
limitations . . . are regularly invoked by courts as a basis for declining to resolve issues of 
presidential power, especially when individual rights are not directly implicated.”); Stack, 
Reviewability, supra note 10, at 1173–77 (explaining that current doctrine “operates to exclude 
judicial review of the determinations or findings the President makes to satisfy conditions for 
invoking grants of statutory power”). But see Lisa Manheim & Kathryn A. Watts, Reviewing 
Presidential Orders, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 7, 41–42, 52) (noting 
increase in judicial review of presidential orders under President Trump and predicting increase 
will likely be “the new normal”). This is particularly true because many presidential factfinding 
authorities will be exercised in foreign affairs and national security contexts where individual 
rights are unlikely to be implicated. See, e.g., Andrew Coan & Nicholas Bullard, Judicial Capacity 
and Executive Power, 102 VA. L. REV. 765, 814 (2016). And even in the instances where courts have 
reviewed presidential factfinding, they have failed to come up with any coherent view of how 
judicial review ought to be conducted, let alone of what the President’s first-order obligations are. 
See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 10, at 1366 (“[A] review of how [national security deference] claims 
have been addressed in actual practice suggests that litigants and judges lack a shared 
understanding of the nature of such claims and of the arguments that are relevant to resolving 
them.”); Manheim & Watts, supra (manuscript at 6) (“[J]udicial precedents [do not] provide 
anything close to a well-developed or coherent legal framework for courts to follow when reviewing 
presidential orders.”); Erica Newland, Executive Orders in Court, 124 YALE L.J. 2026, 2037 (2015) 
(noting absence of “well-developed theory” of judicial review of executive orders); Kevin M. Stack, 
The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 561–68 (2005) [hereinafter Stack, Statutory] (stating 
that courts have not settled on “character or scope” of deference to presidential assertions of 
statutory authority). 
 18. See infra Section II.E.  
 19. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992) (“As the APA does not expressly 
allow review of the President’s actions, we must presume that his actions are not subject to its 
requirements.”). 
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presidential power is typically not subject to any other form of 
meaningful judicial review.20 As a result, adherence to internal 
executive branch processes will often be the only meaningful check on 
presidential power. Yet, as this Part shows, there often appears to be 
no preset process or standard of certainty governing how the President 
finds facts. This Part argues that this presents a particularly dangerous 
state of affairs, that some preset process is normatively desirable to 
address this danger, and identifies options for how such processes or 
standards might be constructed.  
The Article next briefly addresses how Congress might better 
define and enforce desirable limits on presidential factfinding, and then 
takes on the difficult task of identifying a desirable framework for 
judicial review of presidential factfinding. Appropriate judicial review 
must balance the role of courts in ensuring the President abides by her 
legal obligations with the need for appropriate deference to the 
President’s institutional advantages of relative accountability and 
expertise. After explaining why accountability and epistemic rationales 
for deference ought not be presumed in exercises of presidential 
factfinding powers, the Article proposes three potential methods of 
judicial review—process-based deference, hard look review, and 
contextual deference—explains their benefits and costs, and suggests 
that process-based deference is likely the most realistic, desirable 
approach, at least as a preliminary matter.  
This Article thus seeks to make three primary contributions to 
the literature. The first is to unearth presidential factfinding as a 
pervasive and deeply consequential feature of presidential power that 
is in need of serious study. The second is to establish that the President 
has existing legal obligations in how she finds facts and identify what 
those are. And the third is to make progress in identifying how 
presidential factfinding ought to be structured and regulated within the 
executive branch, by Congress, and by the courts.  
In some ways, this project may seem particularly timely. The 
topic of presidential factfinding has arisen in the public sphere in an 
unusually heated way since the inauguration of President Trump. 
Many of President Trump’s most controversial decisions have relied on 
presidential factfinding, including the so-called Travel Ban,21 the 
 
 20. See supra note 17. 
 21. The Travel Ban was premised on the finding that the entry of certain classes of aliens 
would be “detrimental to the interests of the United States.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(f) (West 2019); 
Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017); see also infra notes 178–180(discussing 
the Travel Ban). 
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transgender military service ban,22 the downsizing of certain national 
monuments,23 the decertification of the Iran Deal,24 and the movement 
of the American Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.25 And, going forward, 
presidential factfinding will surely continue to play an important role 
in challenges to Trump administration policies both inside and outside 
the courts.  
But while presidential factfinding may seem particularly salient 
today, it is important to emphasize that there is nothing new about 
presidential factfinding as a core element of presidential power. Nor is 
there anything particularly novel about claims that presidents have not 
been fully truthful with the American public, including about deeply 
important things.26 Presidential factfinding may have emerged as an 
area of particularly intense public debate recently, but it is a long-
standing and deeply important feature of presidential power. The hope 
of this Article is to start treating it that way. 
I. THE FIELD OF PRESIDENTIAL FACTFINDING 
This Part seeks to establish the pervasive nature of presidential 
factfinding. Before doing so, a few definitional and scope clarifications 
 
 22. This policy was ostensibly based on the “expense and disruption” that transgender 
military service would cause, but was enjoined based, in part, on the inadequacy of the factfinding 
underlying the policy. See, e.g., Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747, 768 (D. Md. 2017) (“[T]he 
Presidential Memorandum [did not] identify any policymaking process or evidence demonstrating 
that the revocation of transgender rights was necessary for any legitimate national interest.”).  
 23. President Trump based the downsizing on a claim that President Obama had not 
adequately adhered to the requirement that the national monument be “confined to the smallest 
area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected.” 54 U.S.C.A. 
§ 320301(b) (West 2019); Proclamation No. 9681, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,081 (Dec. 4, 2017). 
 24. President Trump refused to certify the deal on the ground that the sanctions relief in the 
deal was not “appropriate and proportionate” to Iran’s actions and that the deal was not “vital to 
the national security interests of the United States,” but only after his cabinet apparently would 
not support his factual claim that Iran had not complied with the deal—another requirement for 
certification. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2160e(d)(6)(A) (West 2019); Peter Baker, Trump Recertifies Iran 
Nuclear Deal, but Only Reluctantly, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/07/17/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-recertify.html [https://perma.cc/2NCN-LSKH]; 
Donald J. Trump, U.S. President, Remarks by President Trump on Iran Strategy (Oct. 13, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-iran-strategy 
[https://perma.cc/MPR7-K9AJ]. 
 25. President Trump’s justification for moving the embassy was ostensibly predicated, at 
least in part, on the notion that he could not make the finding that keeping the embassy out of 
Jerusalem was “necessary to protect the national security interests of the United States.” 
Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-45, § 7, 109 Stat. 398, 400; see Donald J. Trump, 
U.S. President, Statement by President Trump on Jerusalem (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-jerusalem/ 
[https://perma.cc/L93Q-F2C8]. 
 26. See infra Section II.E. 
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are in order. First, for purposes of this Article, the term “presidential 
factfinding powers” refers to powers that require the President to first 
find certain facts before exercising an authority or duty. Second, the 
Article focuses specifically on delegations to the President rather than 
agency heads, as, unlike power delegated to agency heads, the 
President’s exercise of power is not governed by the APA.27 Third, by 
“fact,” I mean a determination that some phenomenon exists or is likely 
to exist in the world. This definition is certainly debatable, and I do not 
mean for too much to ride on it.28 One could broaden or narrow it, but 
whatever the definition, there are numerous presidential powers 
contingent on the President first making what can commonsensically 
be called a finding of “fact.” Finally, the purpose of this Part is to 
establish that the phenomenon of presidential factfinding is pervasive, 
but it is not meant to be exhaustive. There are simply too many 
examples to list them all. This Part should thus be thought of as a 
survey rather than a fully comprehensive list. At bottom, this Part 
shows that presidential factfinding powers span constitutional, 
statutory, and international law and range from the deeply 
consequential to the mundane. They are new. They are old. They really 
are everywhere.  
A. Constitutional Law  
Presidential factfinding is a common feature of constitutional 
law. It is present in foreign policy, national security, and emergency 
powers, as well as more mundane powers, such as when to call Congress 
into a special session or recommend legislation. 
To start with the more consequential authorities, before the 
President can use force abroad without congressional authorization, she 
must first conclude that such use of force is meant to further an 
“important national interest.”29 The Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) has 
 
 27. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992) (concluding that the APA does 
not apply to the President’s actions). 
 28. For other examples of how to define “fact” or “finding of fact,” see LOUIS L. JAFFE, 
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 548 (1965) (“A finding of fact is the assertion that 
a phenomenon has happened or is or will be happening independent of or anterior to any assertion 
as to its legal effect.”); William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-
Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 894–97 (2013) (dividing 
congressional factfinding into “[e]mpirical facts . . . whose truth or falsity can be tested by 
experience or experiment in the world”; “[e]valuative facts,” which “are statements reflecting 
conclusions drawn from empirical facts”; and “[v]alue-based” facts, which “reflect a heavier 
component of value choice than empiricism”); and Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U. 
PA. L. REV. 59, 72–73 (2013). 
 29. See, e.g., Auth. to Use Military Force in Libya, supra note 1, at *6.  
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concluded that permissible “national interests” include protecting 
American lives and property abroad, preserving “regional stability,” 
maintaining the credibility of United Nations Security Council 
mandates, and, recently, mitigating humanitarian disasters.30 
Although debate continues over whether these or other predicates 
qualify as sufficient “national interests,”31 the point is that no matter 
which determinations qualify, they are all predicated on the President 
finding facts—e.g., that the use of force is necessary for self-defense, to 
protect American lives, or preserve regional stability. Indeed, according 
to OLC, the one potential constitutionally based limit on the President’s 
authority to use force in defense of national interests is that such use of 
force cannot constitute a “war” for purposes of Article I’s Declare War 
Clause,32 a determination that, itself, “requires a fact-specific 
assessment of the ‘anticipated nature, scope, and duration’ of the 
planned military operations.”33  
Apart from use of force, the President must also find certain 
facts in order to settle American citizens’ claims against foreign states. 
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
President possesses the power to settle American citizens’ claims 
against foreign states where such settlement is “determined to be a 
necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute 
between our country and another.”34 The President also has exclusive 
authority to recognize foreign governments, another authority that 
likely requires the President to find certain facts—i.e., that the “ ‘entity 
possesses the qualifications for statehood,’ including a defined territory, 
permanent population, government control, and capacity to engage in 
international relations.”35   
 
 30. See April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chem.-Weapons Facilities, 42 Op. O.L.C., 2018 
WL 2760027, at *10–11 (2018); Auth. to Use Military Force in Libya, supra note 1, at *10.  
 31. See supra note 7; see also JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL 
LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 6 (1993) (stating that the use of force authority only 
includes responding to “ ‘sudden attacks’ until there [is] time for Congress to convene and confer”); 
William Michael Treanor, The War Powers Outside the Courts, 81 IND. L.J. 1333, 1342–43 (2006) 
(discussing views on when congressional authorization of military action is necessary). 
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 33. Auth. to Use Military Force in Libya, supra note 1, at *8; see also Saikrishna Bangalore 
Prakash, Military Force and Violence, but Neither War nor Hostilities, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 995, 999 
(2016) (“The war test . . . consists of a highly intensive facts-and-circumstances test . . . .”).  
 34. 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981). For scholarship on the debate over the scope of this authority, 
see, for example, Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The Dangers of Deference: International Claim Settlement 
by the President, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2003); and Adam S. Zimmerman, Presidential Settlements, 
163 U. PA. L. REV. 1393, 1454–55 (2015). 
 35. Jack Goldsmith, Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the Executive Branch, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
112, 113–14 (2015) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 201, 202 cmt. a 
(AM. LAW INST. 1987)). 
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Many believe the President also has constitutional authority to 
act in emergency situations to preserve order and stability.36 The 
executive has frequently claimed such power in military situations,37 
but such claims have also arisen in more mundane circumstances.38 The 
point to see for our purposes is that if this authority exists,39 it is 
contingent on the President first making factual findings—i.e., that a 
relevant emergency exists and the conduct in question is necessary to 
address it. Relatedly, some believe the President has the power to 
suspend habeas corpus “when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
public Safety may require it,”40 another authority that requires 
factfinding—i.e., that there is a “Rebellion or Invasion” and that 
suspending the writ would be “require[d]” by “the public Safety.” 
Factfinding is also a key part of constitutional authorities 
outside of the foreign affairs and national security space. Presidents 
have claimed a right to withhold documents from Congress and the 
public based on “executive privilege,” a claim that also requires 
factfinding.41 The President’s appointment power also might require 
 
 36. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 691 (1952) (Vinson, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he Executive may be under a grave constitutional duty to act for the national 
protection in situations not covered by the acts of Congress . . . .”); Robert J. Delahunty & John C. 
Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM 
Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 808, 856 (2013) (arguing that a “presidential 
prerogative” authorizes the President to act “on the grounds of compelling public necessity”). 
 37. See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 10, at 1380–82 (listing executive claims of military 
exigency).  
 38. See, e.g., Auth. to Use Troops to Prevent Interference with Fed. Emps. by Mayday 
Demonstrations and Consequent Impairment of Gov’t Functions, 1 Supp. Op. O.L.C. 343, 344 
(1971) (concluding impending “Mayday” protests could justify use of troops, if necessary, to carry 
out the “President’s constitutional duty to protect th[e] functioning [of the government] and 
prevent its obstruction”); see also Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11, 74 (1993) (noting “the existence of a valid presidential power to protect the 
personnel, property, and instrumentalities of the United States,” including outside of emergency 
contexts). 
 39. Whether such power exists is highly contested. Compare Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 646–
51 (Jackson, J., concurring) (rejecting argument that President has “inherent” power to “deal with 
a crisis or an emergency according to the necessities of the case, the unarticulated assumption 
being that necessity knows no law”), with Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 36, at 808, 856 (arguing 
that “presidential prerogative” authorizes the President to act “on the grounds of compelling public 
necessity” even when not explicitly authorized by statute and perhaps even in violation of statutory 
law). 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. The standard view is that only Congress possesses this authority, 
but the executive branch has previously suggested the President possesses it. E.g., Removal of 
Japanese Aliens and Citizens from Haw. to the U.S., 1 Supp. Op. O.L.C. 84 (1942); Suspension of 
the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 74 (1861).  
 41. See, e.g., Assertion of Exec. Privilege in Response to Cong. Demands for Law Enf’t Files, 
6 Op. O.L.C. 31 (1982); Rex E. Lee, Executive Privilege, Congressional Subpoena Power, and 
Judicial Review: Three Branches, Three Powers, and Some Relationships, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 231, 
251 (“[E]xecutive privilege . . . permit[s] the President to withhold information whose 
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factfinding if the President is obligated to ensure that the person she 
appoints is suitable and qualified for the position.42 The President’s 
authority to remove lands from public sale when she deems such 
removals in the “public interest”43 also requires initial factfinding, as 
does the President’s duty to recommend to Congress “such Measures as 
he shall judge necessary and expedient,”44 and to convene a special 
session of Congress if he determines there is an “extraordinary 
Occasion[ ].”45  
This list of constitutional factfinding powers is not meant to be 
exhaustive.46 The purpose, instead, is to show that such powers are 
commonplace, spanning areas related to foreign affairs, military, 
domestic emergency, executive privilege, and legislative 
recommendations, among others.   
B. Statutory Law 
Presidential factfinding is remarkably pervasive in statutory 
law, spanning a wide range of substantive areas. To start, it is a 
common feature of national security authorities. For example, shortly 
after 9/11, Congress passed the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military 
 
dissemination, in his considered view, would be sufficiently detrimental to the public 
interest . . . .”). 
 42. See, e.g., Qualifications of Public Printer, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 96, 97 (1924) (noting that the 
President “determine[s] whether the particular person appointed possessed the necessary skill to 
discharge the duties attaching to the position”); The Navy Efficiency Acts, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 335, 
351 (1857) (“These facts [relating to fitness or unfitness of person for particular appointment] it is 
the duty of the President, in all cases of nomination to office, to determine as he best may, by 
personal or by communicated knowledge.”). 
 43. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915) (“Emergencies may occur, 
or conditions may so change as to require that [the President] should, in the public interest, 
withhold the land from sale . . . .”). 
 44. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 45. Id.; see also Presidential Auth. to Call a Special Session of Cong., 1 Supp. Op. O.L.C. 140, 
141 (1947) (“The important factor would appear to be . . . that the Congress is not in session and 
that an extraordinary occasion has arisen which requires that it be in session . . . earlier than it 
otherwise would.”). 
 46. See also, e.g., Presidential Discretion to Delay Making Determinations Under the Chem. 
and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, 19 Op. O.L.C. 306, 321–26 
(1995) (noting “inherent authority to employ sources for gathering intelligence needed to protect 
the national security of the United States” which “will undoubtedly require careful assessments of 
the specific facts in each case”); Whether a Three-Day Recess by One Chamber of Cong. Constitutes 
an Adjournment for Purposes of the Pocket Veto Clause, 1 Supp. Op. O.L.C. 25, 25 (1934) (stating 
that the Pocket Veto can be used only if congressional adjournment “ ‘prevents’ the President from 
returning the bill to the House in which it originated within the time allowed” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 680 (1929))); Office & Duties of Att’y 
Gen., 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 326, 349–50 (1854) (suggesting pardon power requires investigation of facts 
underlying case). 
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Force (“2001 AUMF”), providing that “the President is authorized to use 
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001.”47 This authority is reliant on numerous factual 
determinations: the President must determine which “nations, 
organizations, or persons” “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” 
the terrorist attacks on 9/11, and what constitutes “necessary or 
appropriate force” against them.  
It is worth spending a little time on this authority to highlight 
how common it is for interpreters to debate precisely which facts the 
President must find to exercise a particular authority. The 2001 AUMF 
undoubtedly authorizes the President to use force against al Qaeda and 
the Taliban, but debate has persisted since its passage regarding which 
other organizations, if any, the President can use force against.48 It is 
now generally—although not universally—agreed that the 2001 AUMF 
authorizes use of force not solely against al Qaeda and the Taliban but 
also their “associated forces.”49 To be an “associated force,” the executive 
branch has suggested the group must, among other things, be a 
“co-belligerent” of al Qaeda or the Taliban.50 Rebecca Ingber has 
recently argued that there are, in fact, two variations of the 
“co-belligerency” test: the more permissive “support test,” which 
requires “the substantial provision of support” by a group to al Qaeda 
but not necessarily direct attacks on the United States, and the more 
restrictive “Active Hostilities Test,” which provides that only groups 
directly engaged in “active hostilities” against the United States would 
be included.51 As Ingber points out, which test applies can make the 
difference between the President having the power to strike a terrorist 
group and not having such power.52 As this discussion illustrates, the 
various debates regarding what test is appropriate all revolve around 
determining which factual predicates suffice to authorize force. Thus, 
the point to see here is that no matter the proper test for determining 
 
 47. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 
(2001).  
 48. See, e.g., Ingber, supra note 8, at 70 (collecting sources on debate). 
 49. Cf., e.g., Ali v. Obama, 736 F.3d 542, 544 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[T]he AUMF authorizes the 
President to detain enemy combatants . . . part of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces.”). 
 50. THE WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE 
UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 4 (Dec. 
2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/framework.Report_Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2BTZ-TWBV] [hereinafter W.H. REPORT]. 
 51. Ingber, supra note 8, at 72–73, 85–87. 
 52. Id. at 88, 96. 
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whether a terrorist group can be attacked under the 2001 AUMF, 
presidential factfinding is required.53   
Presidential factfinding is present in numerous other military 
authorities. For example, under the War Powers Resolution, the 
President can extend the sixty-day limit on the use of military force 
permitted without a declaration of war if she “determines and certifies 
to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity 
respecting the safety of the United States Armed Forces requires the 
continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a 
prompt removal of such forces.”54 The President has authority to call 
out the militia if it is necessary “to suppress . . . any insurrection, 
domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy [that] . . . so 
hinders the execution of [state or federal] . . . laws” such that any class 
of people are deprived of a constitutional right and ordinary state 
authorities “are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right.”55 The 
President also possesses numerous powers over military personnel 
contingent on factfinding. For example, the President can change the 
rations for members of the Navy if she “determines that economy and 
health and comfort of the members . . . require such action”56 and pay 
death benefits to dependents of members of the armed services if she 
“determines that the disability or death - - (1) was caused by hostile 
action; and (2) was a result of the relationship of the dependent to the 
member of the uniformed services.”57 The President possesses 
numerous other military authorities contingent on finding facts, 
including the authority to increase the number of active-duty armed 
forces members; to arm water or aircraft; to override foreign ship-
building prohibitions; to regulate servicemembers’ duties, pay, benefits, 
rations, and housing; and even to determine whether experimental 
drugs can be used on servicemembers.58  
 
 53. See, e.g., W.H. REPORT, supra note 50, at 7 (“[T]he Executive Branch’s decision that a 
group is covered by the 2001 AUMF . . . follows careful consideration and fact-intensive reviews by 
senior government lawyers and is informed by departments and agencies with relevant expertise 
and institutional roles . . . .”). 
 54. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2012). 
 55. 10 U.S.C.A. § 253 (West 2019).  
 56. 10 U.S.C.A. § 6082(a) (West 2019).  
 57. 10 U.S.C. § 1032(a) (2012).  
 58. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 671b(a) (2012) (extend active duty periods “when the President 
determines that the national interest so requires”); 10 U.S.C.A. § 261(a)–(b) (West 2019) (arm 
water and aircraft if President “determines that the security of the United States is threatened by 
the application, or the imminent danger of application, of physical force by any foreign government 
or agency against the United States, its citizens, the property of its citizens, or their commercial 
interests”); 14 U.S.C. § 665(b) (2012) (prohibition on ship building in foreign shipyard can be 
suspended if “the President determines that it is in the national security interest of the United 
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The President possesses numerous factfinding authorities in the 
foreign affairs field as well. For example, the President can waive 
certain restrictions on transactions with Cuba if she determines that 
the Government of Cuba has, among other things, “held free and fair 
elections conducted under internationally recognized observers,” 
“permitted opposition parties ample time to organize and campaign for 
such elections, and has permitted full access to the media to all 
candidates in the elections.”59 Dealings with Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority also frequently rely on presidential factfinding. For example, 
the President can only provide aid to the “Hamas-controlled Palestinian 
Authority” if she certifies that it has, among other things, “committed 
itself and is adhering to all previous agreements” with the United 
States, Israel, and the international community, and made 
“demonstrable progress” toward “dismantling all terrorist 
infrastructure within its jurisdiction” and halting anti-Israel and anti-
American incitement in its school materials.60 Similarly, Congress has 
required the Palestine Liberation Organization to shut down its offices 
in the United States unless the President can certify that the 
Palestinians have not, among other things, taken any action “intended 
to influence a determination” by the International Criminal Court 
(“ICC”) to initiate an investigation against Israel.61 
The President’s authorities and obligations related to sanctions 
are also often contingent on factfinding. For example, the President 
must impose sanctions if she determines that a foreign government has 
“used lethal chemical or biological weapons against its own nationals”62 
 
States to do so”); 10 U.S.C.A. § 125(b) (West 2019) (reassign duties if “necessary because of 
hostilities or an imminent threat of hostilities”); 10 U.S.C § 12305(a) (2012) (suspend promotion, 
retirement, or separation for any member of armed forces “who the President determines is 
essential to the national security of the United States”); 10 U.S.C.A. § 6082(a) (West 2019) (alter 
Navy rations if the President “determines that economy and the health and comfort of the members 
of the naval service require such action”); 42 U.S.C. § 1503 (2012) (increase housing in “any 
localities where the President determines that there is an acute shortage of housing which impedes 
the national defense program and that the necessary housing would not otherwise be provided 
when needed for persons engaged in national defense activities”); 10 U.S.C. § 1107(f) (2012) (waive 
consent requirement for administering drugs to servicemembers only if the President determines 
“that obtaining consent is not in the interests of national security”). 
 59. 22 U.S.C. § 6007 (2012). 
 60. 22 U.S.C. § 2378b(a)–(b) (2012). 
 61. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, § 7041(l)(2)(B), 131 Stat. 135, 
667; see also Josh Lederman, U.S. Backtracks on Decision to Close Palestinian Office in DC, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/ed3d53ccff0e46e9951858f337e2c42a 
[https://perma.cc/Y958-MV5A] (discussing an instance when the Trump administration limited the 
activities the Palestine Liberation Organization’s office in the United States could undertake 
because the administration would not make this certification following Palestinian President 
Mahmoud Abbas’s statements calling for the ICC to investigate and prosecute Israelis). 
 62. 22 U.S.C. § 5604(a) (2012). 
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or that “a foreign person . . . has knowingly and materially contributed” 
to the efforts of certain foreign countries to use or acquire chemical or 
biological weapons.63 And the recent Russia sanctions bill provides that 
the President “shall” impose sanctions with respect to any person “the 
President determines . . . knowingly engages in significant activities 
undermining cybersecurity against any person . . . or government on 
behalf of [Russia].”64 Presidential factfinding is also frequently present 
in other foreign affairs powers, including those related to entering into 
arms agreements, providing foreign aid or military assistance, and 
protecting foreign cultural objects from judicial power.65   
Presidential factfinding is also frequently present in trade 
authorities. For example, the President’s authority to enter into major 
trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, is contingent 
on making a determination “that one or more existing duties or other 
import restrictions of any foreign country . . . are unduly burdening and 
restricting the foreign trade of the United States” and that certain 
congressional objectives will be met by the deal.66 In addition, if the 
President “find[s] as a fact that any foreign country places any burden 
or disadvantage upon the commerce of the United States by [certain] 
unequal impositions or discriminations” she can “declare such new or 
additional rate or rates of duty as [s]he shall determine will offset such 
burden or disadvantage.”67 Other trade examples include that the 
President is authorized to give beneficial trade status to certain 
countries, to impose or terminate duties or import restrictions, and to 
raise trade quota levels, all predicated on finding certain facts.68  
 
 63. 50 U.S.C. § 4613(a) (2012). 
 64. Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 9524(a) (West 
2019). 
 65. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2767(j) (2012) (authorizing arms agreements with “any friendly 
foreign country not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” upon presidential finding 
that such an agreement “would be in the foreign policy or national security interests of the United 
States”); 7 U.S.C.A. § 1733(j) (West 2019) (limiting aid to countries engaging in a “consistent 
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” as determined by the 
President); 22 U.S.C. § 2459(a) (2012) (removing judicial jurisdiction over cultural artifacts if the 
President determines that the object has “cultural significance” and its display in the United 
States is “in the national interest”). 
 66. 19 U.S.C.A. § 4202(a) (West 2019). 
 67. 19 U.S.C. § 1338(d) (2012). 
 68. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C.A. § 3703 (West 2019) (describing beneficial status if the President 
determines, among other things, that a country “established . . . a market-based economy that 
protects private property rights”); 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b) (2012) (asserting a lack of beneficial trading 
status if, among other things, a country is communist, part of an arrangement to withhold certain 
commodities from international trade, or has nationalized American property); 7 U.S.C. § 624(b) 
(2012) (authorizing certain import duties if “the President finds the existence of [certain] facts”); 
19 U.S.C. § 3601(b) (2012) (authorizing the President to change quota levels based on certain 
factual findings). 
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Factfinding is also present in the President’s immigration 
powers. For example, as made famous by President Trump’s so-called 
Travel Ban, the President can suspend the entry of certain classes of 
aliens if she deems their entry “detrimental to the interests of the 
United States.”69 The President also sets the number of refugees 
permitted to enter into the country by determining the number that is 
“justified by humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the national 
interest.”70 
The President also has serious powers if she finds there is an 
emergency or disaster, a determination that requires finding facts. For 
example, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(“IEEPA”), the President can regulate or prohibit any foreign exchange 
transactions and the import or export of currencies or securities, and 
nullify property holdings in the United States upon declaring a 
“national emergency” relating to “any unusual and extraordinary 
threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the 
United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the 
United States.”71 The President can also trigger significant domestic 
powers if she declares certain types of disasters or critical shortages of 
supplies or energy, all of which “depend[ ] on the particular facts 
presented” by the situation.72 Even absent an “emergency,” the 
President has possessed serious domestic economic power to stabilize 
“prices, rents, wages, and salaries,” predicated on making a 
determination that, for example, “prices or wages in [a relevant] 
industry or segment of the economy have increased at a rate which is 
 
 69. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(f) (West 2019). 
 70. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2) (2012). 
 71. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1702 (2012).  
 72. Legal Auths. Available to the President to Respond to a Severe Energy Supply 
Interruption, 6 Op. O.L.C. 644, 650 (1982) (“[I]t is impossible to determine in the absence of specific 
facts when exercise of [the relevant] authority would be consistent with the terms of the statute.”); 
see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 713d-1(a) (2012) (discussing presidential findings regarding when a critical 
energy supply shortage has taken place); 42 U.S.C.A. § 5122 (West 2019) (“emergency” powers 
triggered upon presidential determination that federal assistance is necessary to “save lives and 
to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe 
in any part of the United States”); id. (“major disaster” powers triggered upon presidential 
determination that a “natural catastrophe . . . causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude 
to warrant” supplemental assistance to state and local governments); 42 U.S.C.A. § 6202(8) (West 
2019) (“severe energy supply interruption” powers triggered upon presidential determination that 
“a national energy supply shortage” is, or is likely to result from, “an interruption in the supply of 
imported petroleum products,” “an interruption in the supply of domestic petroleum products,” or 
“sabotage, an act of terrorism, or an act of God”; is likely to be “of significant scope and duration, 
and of an emergency nature”; and is likely to “cause major adverse impact on national safety or 
the national economy”). 
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grossly disproportionate to the rate at which prices or wages have 
increased in the economy generally.”73  
Apart from these foreign affairs and emergency authorities, 
factfinding is also present in one of the most discussed aspects of 
presidential power: for-cause removal. All for-cause removal statutes 
require the President to find facts to exercise them—i.e., that there was 
“cause,” such as “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”74  
Factfinding is also a part of more mundane but consequential 
domestic powers. For example, the President’s power to create national 
monuments is contingent on finding facts—i.e., that “landmarks, 
historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or 
scientific interest . . . are situated on land owned or controlled by the 
Federal Government” and that the reserved parcels of land are 
“confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and 
management of the objects to be protected.”75 The President can also 
issue regulations relating to procurement contracts, which affect a large 
part of the economy, only if she determines that such regulations will 
“promote economy and efficiency in government procurement.”76   
  Apart from these more high-profile authorities, some factfinding 
authorities are quite obscure. For example, the President possessed 
authority to extend a deadline for when private bus services had to be 
accessible to individuals with disabilities, but only if she “determin[ed]” 
that compliance with previously issued deadlines would “result in a 
significant reduction in intercity over-the-road bus service.”77 
Factfinding is present in far more areas of presidential power. It is a 
 
 73. See, e.g., Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, § 202(a)–(b), 84 Stat. 
796, 799–800; Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 
752–53 (D.D.C. 1971) (upholding delegation of authority).  
 74. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2012); see also Datla & Revesz, supra note 5, at 786 (collecting 
sources listing such for-cause removal authorities). Indeed, despite significant commentary on the 
constitutionality of for-cause removal and what precisely is sufficient to constitute “cause,” there 
has been little discussion of how the President goes about finding whether such “cause” is present. 
See Aditya Bamzai, Taft, Frankfurter, and the First Presidential For-Cause Removal, 52 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 691, 746 n.328 (2018) (discussing debate over what constitutes “cause”); see also id. at 745 
(suggesting a notice and hearing requirement for for-cause removal of officers). 
 75. 54 U.S.C.A. § 320301(a)–(b) (West 2019); see also Bruff, supra note 10, at 36–38 (noting a 
number of factual issues underlying national monument designations). 
 76. Auth. to Issue Exec. Order on Gov’t Procurement, 19 Op. O.L.C. 90, 90 (1995) (President 
can promulgate regulations governing procurement contracts if determines regulations “will 
promote economy and efficiency in government procurement”); see 40 U.S.C. §§ 101, 121(a) (2012); 
Bruff, supra note 10, at 42 (noting factual issues underlying use of authority). 
 77. 42 U.S.C. § 12185(d) (2012); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1706c(a) (2012) (providing that the 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development can increase mortgage insurance if the President 
determines the increase to be in the “public interest,” after “taking into account the general effect 
of any such increase upon conditions in the building industry and upon the national economy”). 
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feature of presidential authorities regulating the environment, public 
health, public lands, government organization, government pay, the 
census, housing, criminal law, budget- and debt-ceiling authorities, and 
even the Congressional Review Act.78  
  While a comprehensive account of all statutory authorities 
requiring the President to find facts would require an entire article of 
its own, the point for now is simply to show how common presidential 
factfinding is. Presidential factfinding spans virtually every 
substantive area of presidential authority, from military and foreign 
affairs to housing insurance.79 It is a truly pervasive feature of the 
President’s statutory power. 
C. International Law 
There are also numerous powers under international law that 
are contingent on presidential factfinding.80 For example, under 
international law, a state can use force in violation of another state’s 
sovereignty when it is in “self-defense,” which is understood to include 
protection against “imminent” attacks.81 “Imminence” is determined by 
considering, among other things, “the nature and immediacy of the 
threat; the probability of an attack; . . . [and] the likely scale of the 
attack and the injury, loss, or damage likely to result therefrom.”82 
 
 78. As merely representative examples, see 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321 (West 2019) (discharge of 
hazardous substances); 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012) (Continental Shelf boundaries); 43 U.S.C. § 2007 
(2012) (oil transport system); 5 U.S.C. § 903(a) (2012) (government reorganization); 5 U.S.C. 
§ 5570(b) (2012) (government benefits); Continuing Appropriations, 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-369, 
§ 118, 94 Stat. 1351, 1357 (1980) (special census); 31 U.S.C. § 3101A(a)(1)(A) (2012) (debt-ceiling 
increase); 5 U.S.C. § 801(c)(2) (2012) (Congressional Review Act). 
 79. Indeed, statutory presidential factfinding is hardly new. To the contrary, such authorities 
date back to the Founding era. See, e.g., JOHN PRESTON COMER, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF 
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES 64–85 (1927) (discussing history of legislation contingent 
on factfinding); see also Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 683 (1892) (noting that 
“frequently, from the organization of the government to the present time,” Congress passed 
statutes that “depend upon the action of the president based upon . . . the ascertainment by him 
of certain facts”); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421–22 & n.9 (1935) (listing such authorities). 
 80. To be clear, international law does not require the President, per se, to find these facts—
it requires the state to do so. But the examples that follow are powers that the President exercises 
as a matter of domestic law, and the obligations therefore attach to her. 
 81. U.N. Charter art. 51; W.H. REPORT, supra note 50, at 9: 
The U.N. Charter recognizes the inherent right of States to resort to force in individual 
or collective self-defense against an armed attack . . . . Under the jus ad bellum, a State 
may use force in the exercise of its inherent right of self-defense not only in response to 
armed attacks that have already occurred, but also in response to imminent attacks 
before they occur. 
 82. W.H. REPORT, supra note 50, at 9 (quoting Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against an 
Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 769, 775 (2012)). 
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Apart from “imminence,” the executive branch has also argued that 
force can be used in violation of another state’s sovereignty if that state 
is “unwilling or unable” to take care of the particular threat, which “can 
be demonstrated most plainly where . . . a State has lost or abandoned 
effective control over the portion of its territory where the armed group 
is operating” or where the state “is colluding with or harboring a 
terrorist organization operating from within its territory and refuses to 
address the threat posed by the group.”83 The scope of these authorities 
is the subject of heated debate. But whatever their proper scope, relying 
on these authorities requires the President to find certain facts. Apart 
from these jus ad bellum questions, there are a number of jus in bello 
questions, relating to targeting decisions, detention, and the like, which 
also require factfinding.84  
These are hardly the only international law authorities that 
require factfinding. The point here is simply to provide a brief survey to 
show that presidential factfinding authorities are not limited to 
domestic law. That said, going forward in discussing the President’s 
legal obligations in conducting factfinding, I will bracket international 
law authorities because they present distinct issues and challenges.85 
D. A Taxonomy of Presidential Factfinding 
Above I have sought to provide a survey of presidential 
factfinding powers spanning constitutional, statutory, and 
international law. Before moving on to describing the positive and 
normatively desirable obligations on presidential factfinding, it is 
helpful to explain how factfinding powers fit into the broader realm of 
presidential power. Presidential powers might be divided into three 
broad types: (1) Pure Fact, (2) Mixed Fact and Policy, and (3) Pure 
Discretion powers, with the positive and normative analysis discussed 
below attaching to Pure Fact and Mixed Fact and Policy powers but not 
 
 83. Id. at 10; see also Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative 
Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 486 (2012) (“[I]t is lawful for 
State X, which has suffered an armed attack by an insurgent or terrorist group, to use force in 
State Y against that group if State Y is unwilling or unable to suppress the threat.”). 
 84. For example, international law limits requiring states to abide by the principles of 
distinction, proportionality, necessity, and humanity when using force all require intensive 
factfinding. See, e.g., W.H. REPORT, supra note 50, at 20–21. Military detention also requires 
factfinding. For example, the executive branch has stated that it can detain persons if they “were 
part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qa’ida forces or associated forces,” id. at 29, a 
determination that requires resolving complex factual questions. See Waxman, supra note 10, at 
1380–82 (discussing factfinding questions raised by varying definitions of who can be detained). 
 85. The extent to which the President is obligated to comply with international law qua 
international law is a highly contested issue that I bracket for purposes of this Article. 
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to Pure Discretion powers. Of course, this taxonomy is not perfect. The 
types described below are not hermetically sealed but rather operate on 
a spectrum. While there will surely be difficult borderline cases, the 
hope is that identifying these core types will help clarify the analysis 
that follows.86  
1. Pure Fact Powers 
 “Pure Fact” powers require the President to make a “purely 
factual” determination in order to exercise an authority or duty. By a 
“purely factual” determination, I mean an “assertion that a 
phenomenon has happened or is or will be happening independent of or 
anterior to any assertion as to its legal effect.”87 Pure Fact powers 
empower (or mandate) the President to act upon making such a finding. 
Examples of such powers include the President’s duty to 
sanction individuals who have “knowingly and materially 
contributed . . . through the export . . . of [certain] goods or technology” 
to certain countries’ chemical weapons development;88 the authority to 
use force against “nations, organizations, or persons” that “planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001”;89 the authority to waive certain trade restrictions 
if countries have revoked certain laws, opened ports to American 
vessels, or imposed certain duties;90 and the authority to lift bars on 
importing cattle when it can be done “without danger of the 
introduction or spread of contagious or infectious disease.”91 Pure Fact 
determinations might be retrospective or predictive in nature,92 they 
 
 86. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Nonlegal Information and the 
Delegalization of Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 495, 498 (2000) (“All distinctions potentially have 
borderline cases . . . . [A]lthough lawyers, particularly, are likely to be preoccupied with dusk when 
people ask them about the distinction between night and day, we do not believe that the existence 
of borderline cases undercuts the existence of a workable distinction . . . .”).  
 87. JAFFE, supra note 28, at 548.  
 88. See 50 U.S.C. § 4613(a)(1) (2012). 
 89. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 
(2001). 
 90. COMER, supra note 79, at 66.  
 91. See Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 688 (1892) (quoting Act of Mar. 6, 1866, 
14 Stat. 3, 4).  
 92. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Standards of Persuasion and the Distinction Between Fact 
and Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 919 n.10 (1992) (noting that findings of fact can include “what 
will happen,” “what would have happened in the past given a particular set of conditions,” and 
“what would happen in the future given a particular set of conditions”); see also JAFFE, supra note 
28, at 548–49 (“There is . . . no difference in kind between an inference as to the past and an 
inference as to the future, though psychologically we may feel that an inference as to the past is 
‘true,’ an inference as to the future only ‘probable.’ ”). 
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might relate to particular parties or be about more general phenomena 
in the world,93 and they might be more or less verifiable.94  
Regardless of how one wishes to divide up such Pure Fact 
determinations, the core of these findings is that they are meant to be 
descriptions or predictions of the state of the world, independent of the 
application of broad policy judgment. To be sure, some of these facts 
require the exercise of “judgment” in some sense—after all, we cannot 
know if someone “knowingly” gave certain weapons to a foreign state 
but can only infer that state of mind from evidence.95 But the point is 
that, unlike powers in the Mixed Fact and Policy category, there is no 
subsequent policy determination that must be made after the facts are 
found to permit or require the power to be exercised. The finding 
triggering the power is a claim that an empirical phenomenon has or 
will occur.  
2. Mixed Fact and Policy Powers 
Some powers require determinations that mix factual and policy 
judgment. For these authorities, the President must, first, find certain 
facts and, then, make a judgment about whether based on those facts 
the exercise of power meets the judgmental policy criteria the 
Constitution or Congress has set forth. What is important to see for our 
 
 93. For facts relating to specific parties, see, for example, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2012) 
(suspension of assistance to certain countries if “any member who was elected to that country’s 
parliament has been removed from that office or arrested through extraconstitutional processes”); 
22 U.S.C. § 2797a(a) (2012) (authorizing sanctions on U.S. persons upon finding they “knowingly” 
exported certain missile technologies). For facts relating to more general phenomena, see, for 
example, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b) (2012) (asserting a lack of status if country is, among other things, 
“controlled by international communism” or engaged in “an arrangement of countries . . . to 
withhold supplies of vital commodity resources from international trade”); 19 U.S.C.A. § 3703 
(West 2019) (describing beneficial status if country established a “market-based economy that 
protects private property rights”). This distinction draws on K.C. Davis’s famous dichotomy of 
“adjudicative” and “legislative” facts, see, e.g., 2 DAVIS, supra note 12, § 12:3, at 412, but because 
the President does not engage in trial-like, formal adjudication even for what Davis would call 
“adjudicative” (who, what, where, when) facts, I find the terminology more distracting than 
illuminating in this context. 
 94. As examples of varying levels of verifiability, see 22 U.S.C. § 2378b (2012), which states 
that the President can authorize aid only if she certifies that the Hamas-controlled Palestinian 
Authority “publicly acknowledged the Jewish state of Israel’s right to exist”; made “demonstrable 
progress” toward “destroying unauthorized arms factories, thwarting and preempting terrorist 
attacks, and fully cooperating with Israel’s security services”; and is “ensuring democracy, the rule 
of law, and an independent judiciary.” 
 95. See JAFFE, supra note 28, at 548–49, 551–52 (“A finding of fact does not require — because 
it cannot require — that the phenomenon so found have been or be an absolute reality. The finding 
is neither more nor less than an inference based on evidence.”). 
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purposes is that, even if the ultimate determination is one of “policy 
judgment,” it is reliant on factual investigation.96  
Numerous powers arguably fall into this category. For example, 
the President’s ostensible constitutional authority to use unilateral 
military force if it is in furtherance of certain important “national 
interests,”97 to settle American claims if they are a “necessary incident 
to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between our country 
and another,”98 to call forth a militia if it is “necessary to suppress” an 
insurrection,99 or to enter into certain trade agreements if current 
duties are “unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the 
United States.”100 Common statutory requirements that the President 
find that certain conduct is in the “national interest,”101 “paramount 
interest of the United States,”102 “national security interest,”103 or 
 
 96. OLC, itself, has provided support for the notion that such determinations are contingent 
on underlying facts. See, e.g., Legal Auths. Available to the President to Respond to a Severe 
Energy Supply Interruption, 6 Op. O.L.C. 644, 650 (1982):  
[T]o the extent that the President’s authority under certain statutes rests on a 
discretionary presidential finding, for example, that an emergency situation exists or 
that actions are necessary and appropriate “in the national interest,” to promote the 
“national defense,” or to fulfill international obligations of the United States, it is 
impossible to determine in the absence of specific facts when exercise of that authority 
would be consistent with the terms of the statute.  
(emphasis added). And in Field v. Clark, the Court made clear that the ultimate “judgment” that 
certain tariffs unreasonably affected American commerce had to be predicated on empirical 
investigation. See 143 U.S. at 693:  
The words “he may deem,” in the third section, of course implied that the president 
would examine the commercial regulations of other countries producing and exporting 
[certain goods], and form a judgment as to whether they were reciprocally equal and 
reasonable . . . in their effect upon American products. 
(emphasis added) (quoting Tariff Act of 1890, § 3, 26 Stat. 567, 612). 
 97. See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 7, at 664 (discussing “national interest” test for 
uses of force); Auth. to Use Military Force in Libya, supra note 1, at *10 (2011) (stating that the 
President has legal authority to use military force if, inter alia, doing so would “serve sufficiently 
important national interests”). 
 98. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981). 
 99. 10 U.S.C.A. § 253 (West 2019). 
 100. 19 U.S.C.A. § 4202 (West 2019) (emphasis added). 
 101. E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1728a(a) (2012) (permitting the delivery of foreign aid if in the “national 
interest”); 10 U.S.C.A. § 152 (West 2019) (waiving restrictions on appointing officers if “necessary 
in the national interest”); 30 U.S.C.A. § 1412(c)(5) (West 2019) (limiting hard mineral resources 
processing unless “such restrictions contravene the overriding national interests of the United 
States”). 
 102. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 4903(b)(2), 6991f(a), 6961(a) (2012) (providing for exemptions to 
federal law if the President determines something is in the “paramount interest of the United 
States”). 
 103. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C § 12305(a) (2012) (empowering the President to suspend “any provision 
of law relating to promotion, retirement, or separation for any member of armed forces who the 
President determines is essential to the national security of the United States”); 22 U.S.C.A. 
§ 9524(c) (West 2019) (stating that the President can waive Russian sanctions if “in the vital 
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“national defense” interest 104 likely fall into this category as well. What 
is important to see is that, although the ultimate determination might 
require policy judgment, the judgment is based on a set of facts.105  
For example, to determine if certain tariffs are “unduly 
burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the United States,”106 the 
President must first determine the empirical effect of the tariffs. These 
are questions of Pure Fact—i.e., are the tariffs restricting the foreign 
trade of the United States, and, if so, by how much? After investigating 
these empirical questions, the President can then apply policy 
judgment—i.e., is that restriction of trade “undu[e]”?107 Similarly, to 
impose certain conditions on procurement contracts, the President 
must find that the conditions will “promote economy and efficiency in 
government procurement,” a determination that must be predicated on 
an empirical assessment of the consequences of imposing the 
conditions.108  
There are thus two key steps in exercising power in the Mixed 
Fact and Policy category: in one step, empirical investigation is required 
and, in the other, policy judgment is applied to the results of that 
investigation. Although both steps are required, their order might vary 
or iterate. Sometimes, the first step will be to conduct empirical 
investigation, and the second will entail using policy judgment to assess 
whether, in light of that empirical investigation, the use of the power is 
desirable or mandated. In other contexts, the first step might be to use 
policy judgment to determine which facts are relevant, followed by 
empirical investigation, followed by policy judgment applied to the 
results of the investigation. Of course, the President might not always 
consciously separate these steps out cleanly, and, in some 
circumstances, it might be very difficult to do so.109 But, in the main, 
 
national security interests”); Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-45, § 7, 109 Stat. 
398, 400 (empowering the President to suspend requirements related to moving U.S. Embassy to 
Jerusalem if doing so “is necessary to protect the national security interests of the United States”). 
 104. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C.A. § 98f(a) (West 2019) (authorizing release of materials from stockpile 
if “required for . . . the national defense”); 50 U.S.C.A. § 4533 (West 2019) (granting authority to 
contract for certain industrial resources if material is “essential to the national defense”).  
 105. This point is consistent with Louis Jaffe’s “analytical approach” to teasing apart findings 
of fact from questions of law. See JAFFE, supra note 28, at 548. But see 4 DAVIS, supra note 12, 
§ 29:14, at 391–94 (2d ed. 1983) (calling for a “practical approach” to determine appropriate judicial 
review through institutional competence assessment of whether a court or agency would better 
make a finding).  
 106. 19 U.S.C.A. § 4202 (West 2019). 
107. Id. 
 108. See Auth. to Issue Exec. Order on Gov’t Procurement, supra note 76, at 90; Bruff, supra 
note 10, at 42 (noting factual issues underlying finding). 
 109. See, e.g., 1 DAVIS, supra note 12, § 6:13, at 510 (observing that separating factual 
components from policy judgments, while often easy, sometimes presents difficulty); THOMAS L. 
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the two steps can be separated out conceptually and are thus worth 
teasing apart.110 For purposes of this Article, the point is to clarify that 
the positive and normative analysis discussed in Parts II and III below 
apply to the factfinding stage of these powers, even if they do not apply 
to the policy judgment stage.111 
I do not wish to make too much of the distinction between “fact” 
and “policy judgment.” Perhaps the line blurs at the margins. But I 
think the basic distinction is intuitive and helps address a concern some 
may have about categorizing certain arguably vague determinations 
(like what is “reasonable” or “necessary” or in the “national interest”) 
as facts. My contention is that, even if we conceive of these authorities 
as “mixed” questions of fact and policy, they are decidedly mixed, in that 
they require a basis in factfinding, even if there is a step in the analysis 
that allows for an exercise of “policy judgment.”  
And to be sure, the line between Mixed Fact and Policy and Pure 
Fact powers will not always be easy to draw. For example, the statute 
at issue in Field v. Clark provided that certain free-trade provisions 
would be suspended if the President determined that a country’s duties 
were “reciprocally unequal and unreasonable.”112 The Supreme Court 
described this as a finding of “fact,”113 but others have claimed it was 
more of an exercise in policy judgment.114 The point for our purposes is 
that, even if it was a determination of “policy judgment,” it was 
necessarily predicated on particular underlying facts.  
 
HUGHES, THE FATE OF FACTS IN A WORLD OF MEN 6, 23 (1976) (describing a “two-way search: of 
intelligence in search of some policy to influence, and of policy in search of some intelligence for 
support”).  
 110. Cf. Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84 
IND. L.J. 1, 8–9 (2009) (“Although the line between legislatures’ empirical fact-finding and policy 
judgments is not always crisply drawn, it is important to consider each of these legislative 
functions distinctly.”). Indeed, there might be good normative reason to do so. See Jeremy Waldron, 
Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 433, 467 (2013) (arguing for 
“articulated government through successive phases of governance each of which maintains its own 
integrity” (emphasis omitted)).  
 111. I leave for another day whether comparable obligations attach to the policy judgment. Cf. 
Borgmann, supra note 110, at 9 (“Whether to defer to a legislature’s policy choices raises very 
different questions about legitimacy and competency than whether to defer to a legislature’s 
empirical fact-finding.”). 
 112. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 680 (1892).  
 113. Id. at 693 (“As the suspension was absolutely required when the president ascertained 
the existence of a particular fact, it cannot be said that in ascertaining that fact, . . . in obedience 
to the legislative will, he exercised the function of making laws.” (emphasis added)); see also Dep’t 
of Transp. v. Assoc. Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1248 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court 
appeared to understand the statute as calling for . . . a factual determination.”). 
 114. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 364–65 
(2002).  
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3. Pure Discretion Powers 
The third category of powers are “Pure Discretion” powers. 
These powers give the President the authority to act without first 
having to make any particular factual determinations. For example, 
conventional wisdom assumes that the President can remove agency 
heads without for-cause removal protection for any reason or no reason 
at all.115 On this view, removal authority is a Pure Discretion 
authority—the President does not need to find any facts to exercise it. 
Similarly, conventional wisdom assumes that the President can veto 
legislation for any reason or no reason at all—she need not find any 
facts to do so.116 For these Pure Discretion powers, no facts need be 
found, and the obligations described below would not attach.117 
*      *      * 
The point of this taxonomy is to clarify the scope of the 
phenomenon and help identify when the positive and normatively 
desirable obligations discussed in Parts II and III below apply. My 
contention is that presidential factfinding—as I refer to it in this 
Article—occurs whenever the President is required to find facts to 
exercise power. In this taxonomy, this occurs in Pure Fact and Mixed 
Fact and Policy powers, but not in Pure Discretion powers. For Mixed 
Fact and Policy powers, the positive and normative analysis discussed 
below will apply, at least, to the stage of empirical investigation that 
forms the predicate of the ultimate policy determination.  
As with any taxonomy, the categories I provide could certainly 
be disputed.118 Some powers will be difficult to categorize, and others 
will combine features of the different types of powers. Moreover, there 
will often be debate about which substantive facts are required to 
 
 115. Heidi Kitrosser, Presidential Administration: How Implementing Unitary Executive 
Theory Can Undermine Accountability, 40 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 4, 4 (2015) (“Unitary executive 
theorists argue that . . . the president at minimum has unfettered removal power over all federal 
government actors who exercise discretionary executive authority.”).  
 116. J. Richard Broughton, Rethinking the Presidential Veto, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 91, 92 n.10 
(2005) (“Commentators have uniformly posited that, as a descriptive matter, the veto power is 
wholly discretionary.”). 
 117. It is not obvious to me that any such Pure Discretion powers actually exist. The notion 
that the President could use her authority without considering the effects of that use of authority 
on the world seems inconsistent with a view that the President is bound to faithfully execute the 
law. However, to the extent such authorities do exist—as some commentators seem to assume—
the obligations I discuss below would not necessarily attach to such authorities.  
 118. Cf., e.g., Araiza, supra note 28, at 898 (“No typology can comprehensively catalog 
something as broad as the universe of fact types.”). 
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trigger Pure Fact or Mixed Fact and Policy powers.119 But whatever 
facts authorize the President to act, we must know more about how the 
President goes about finding them. The next Part turns to identifying 
what positive obligations attach to presidential factfinding. 
 II. THE POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS ON PRESIDENTIAL FACTFINDING 
What, precisely, are the President’s obligations in finding facts? 
In this Part, I argue that the President has a constitutional duty to be 
honest and engage in reasonable inquiry in finding facts. I ground this 
argument in conventional sources of constitutional interpretation, 
including the text of the Constitution, its structural features, Supreme 
Court precedent, and past branch practice.120 Before getting into the 
analysis, two points of clarification are in order. First, although I give a 
fairly detailed explanation of why a constitutional duty to be honest and 
engage in reasonable inquiry exists, I think it is fairly intuitive. Put at 
a level of abstraction, few would suggest that if the President must find 
facts to exercise power she can do so dishonestly and arbitrarily. That 
said, given that this question has yet to be addressed in the scholarship 
or case law, it is worth providing a more comprehensive account of the 
bases for this duty.121  
Second, the focus of this Part is on the President’s baseline legal 
obligations, regardless of whether particular individual rights are 
implicated. Of course, if the President’s actions infringe on individual 
rights, those rights might raise their own legal requirements in how the 
President exercises authority. For example, in certain contexts, due 
process might require certain procedures—including perhaps judicial 
review—before (or after) certain facts are found.122 However, these 
 
 119. See, e.g., supra notes 31, 48–53 and accompanying text. 
 120. Cf. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 1–119 (1982) 
(discussing conventional sources of constitutional interpretation); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A 
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1194–
1209 (1987) (same); Gillian B. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 
1874 (2015) (relying on “conventional sources of constitutional interpretation, including 
constitutional text, historical practice, precedent, and normative and pragmatic analysis”). 
 121. I hasten to add that while I think the treatment below is more rigorous than any account 
I have seen, it could surely be even more rigorous. Although each modality of constitutional 
interpretation discussed below could be further elaborated, I believe this Part provides sufficient 
grounding for the duty I identify to be accepted.  
 122. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915) 
(stating that no hearing is required for a finding of general facts affecting large classes of people, 
but a hearing is required where a “relatively small number of persons [are] concerned, who [are] 
exceptionally affected”); see also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“[U]nder certain circumstances, the constitutional requirement of due process is a requirement of 
judicial process.”); Kenneth Culp Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARV. L. 
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obligations are distinct from what Article II, on its own, requires when 
due process or other limits are silent—as they very often will be in the 
context of presidential factfinding. This Part thus seeks to focus on 
identifying the President’s baseline obligations in how she finds facts, 
even if no individual rights are implicated and even if judicial review is 
not available.   
And, in case it is not obvious, determining first-order legal 
obligations on the executive branch is important even where compliance 
with these obligations will not be judicially reviewed.123 This is true for, 
at least, three reasons: First, identifying these first-order obligations 
enables public accountability,124 better congressional oversight and 
regulation,125 and, perhaps, the expansion of existing judicial review.126 
 
REV. 193, 198–99 (1956) (“[A] party who has a sufficient interest or right at stake in a 
determination of government action should be entitled to an opportunity to know and to meet, with 
the weapons of rebuttal evidence, cross-examination, and argument, unfavorable evidence of 
adjudicative facts, except in [exceptional circumstances].”). Article III might also impose certain 
requirements. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and 
Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988); Daniel J. Meltzer, Legislative Courts, Legislative Power, 
and the Constitution, 65 IND. L.J. 291, 299 (1990) (“[E]ven when a [non-Article III] federal tribunal 
provides due process, article III may require the availability of at least some judicial review in an 
article III tribunal.”); Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
559 (2007) (examining Congress’s ability to empower non–Article III officials to make factual 
findings that are binding on courts or private parties’ legal disputes). Because determining what 
obligations due process or Article III limits might impose would require fuller treatment than can 
be given here, I leave those questions for another day. 
 123. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2383 (2001): 
For too long, administrative law scholars focused on judicial review and other aspects 
of legal doctrine as if they were the principal determinants of both administrative 
process and administrative substance. They are not, and the most welcome change in 
administrative law scholarship over the past decade or so has been its insistence on this 
point. As this new body of scholarship has shown, much of what is important in 
administration occurs outside the courthouse doors. 
(footnote omitted); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 244 (1976) (“It 
is not mere theory to distinguish between constitutional law and judicial review.”); see also Trump 
v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring): 
There are numerous instances in which the statements and actions of Government 
officials are not subject to judicial scrutiny or intervention. That does not mean those 
officials are free to disregard the Constitution and the rights it proclaims and 
protects. . . . Indeed, the very fact that an official may have broad discretion, discretion 
free from judicial scrutiny, makes it all the more imperative for him or her to adhere to 
the Constitution and to its meaning and its promise. 
 124. See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 17, at 1127 (noting that even outside “formal 
enforcement” of law on the President, “there may still be enforcement through informal 
mechanisms such as congressional backlash and public disapproval”). 
 125. See, e.g., Stack, Statutory, supra note 17, at 568 (“[W]ithout a general framework, 
Congress has no baseline around which to legislate and specifically to indicate when it seeks to 
grant broad deference to the president and when it does not.”). 
 126. See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 17, at 1131 (“[T]he likelihood of judicial review 
is probably affected by the extent to which courts perceive the President to be stretching traditional 
legal understandings.”).  
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Second, there are numerous systems in place whereby executive branch 
lawyers must sign off on conduct as legally permitted before it can take 
effect.127 Thus, if these obligations are identified and accepted 
internally, this can have a tremendous impact on executive branch 
governance.128 Finally, understanding the President’s legal obligations 
can be relevant to determining whether impeachment is an available 
recourse when the President fails to abide by them.129 Indeed, even if 
judicial review were the exclusive focus, understanding the President’s 
first-order obligations is important. It is hard to come up with a 
coherent method of judicial review without understanding what the 
President’s legal obligations are in the first place.130   
In short, this inquiry matters for first-order questions of 
whether the President is obeying the law, as well as toward second-
order inquiries of how courts should review presidential factfinding, 
which are relevant to current, high-profile litigation on the matter.131 
With these clarifications out of the way, the explanation of the 
President’s existing duties in how she finds facts can begin. 
A. Text 
The Take Care Clause provides strong textual support for the 
notion that the President must be honest and engage in reasonable 
inquiry in finding facts. Article II, Section 3 states that the President 
“shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”132 Although the 
 
 127. See, e.g., id. at 1132–34 (observing that “[t]he executive branch contains thousands of 
lawyers” who typically internalize legal norms as a constraint); Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 
1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 80–81 (2017) (“Lawyers 
operate throughout the national administrative state . . . . Few agency policies and sanctioned 
actions go unvetted by lawyers, and agency lawyers often wield substantial power . . . over agency 
policy.”); id. at 78 (“[I]nternal oversight and supervision reach a far broader array of agency action 
than courts can, and are able to prevent unlawful agency actions from occurring in the first place.”). 
 128. See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 17, at 1101, 1132–37 (“To the extent that a 
particular question of presidential power is recognized as a legal question, it is virtually inevitable 
that lawyers somewhere within the executive branch will provide advice on the question.”).  
 129. If the President lies or arbitrarily finds facts for highly consequential exercises of 
authority, this could conceivably qualify as an “egregious abuse[ ] of official authority” subjecting 
the President to impeachment. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 128–29 
(2017) (“[L]ying to Americans about the rationale for a war, and for putting human lives on the 
line, is impeachable.”). 
 130. Put another way, to understand the “decision rule” by which courts ought to review 
whether the President has complied with her legal obligations, we first must understand the 
“operative proposition” that the rule is meant to implement. See Mitchell N. Berman, 
Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004). 
 131. See supra notes 21–25 (describing challenges to Trump administration policies reliant on 
presidential factfinding). 
 132. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  
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clause is famously “delphic,”133 its application here is relatively 
straightforward. While scholars have debated the extent to which the 
Take Care Clause grants the President powers,134 no one debates that 
it imposes a duty on the President to “take Care” that the “Laws” be 
“faithfully executed.”135 It is also generally accepted that the referenced 
“Laws” include both constitutional and statutory laws.136 It follows, 
then, that when the Constitution or a statute requires the President to 
find certain facts as a predicate to exercising power, then such 
factfinding is part of the “execution” of the Law that must be done 
“faithfully.” Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld presidential 
factfinding against a nondelegation challenge on the ground that the 
President was “the mere agent of the law-making department to 
ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to 
take effect,” a duty the Court described as an “execution of the act of 
Congress.”137 In short, it seems clear that factfinding done as a 
predicate to exercise power under statutory or constitutional law is 
“execution” of the law, requiring it to be done “faithfully.” 
But what does executing the Laws “faithfully” entail? The most 
prominent Founding-era dictionary defined “faithfully” as “strict 
adherence to duty and allegiance”; “[w]ithout failure of performance; 
honesty; exactly”; and “[h]onestly; without fraud, trick, or 
ambiguity.”138 Noah Webster’s 1828 dictionary similarly defined 
“faithfully” as with “strict observance of promises, vows, covenants or 
 
 133. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
1835, 1836 (2016). 
 134. The Take Care Clause has been interpreted to provide the President with the power to 
remove officers, control prosecutorial discretion, and take action necessary to protect the 
operations of the federal government. See id. at 1837–38. 
 135. See id. at 1867; see also Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the 
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 62 (1994) (“[T]he Take Care Clause is expressed as a duty 
rather than a power.”); Metzger, supra note 120, at 1876–77 (“Th[e clause’s] obligatory character 
is often obscured by the more prominent and ongoing debate over the scope of presidential power.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 120, at 1878 (highlighting general agreement that the Take 
Care Clause embodies the meaning that the President “must obey constitutional laws and lacks a 
general prerogative or suspension power”). But see Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 36, at 800–01 
(acknowledging that “Laws” includes a duty to obey the Constitution, but arguing that the term 
does not include “statutory law or treaty provisions that [the President] reasonably and in good 
faith considers to be unconstitutional”); Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 133, at 1856 (noting 
the argument that “Laws” does not include constitutional law); Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed 
Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript 
at 24–25) (stating that “[w]e have not reached a confident answer to the question whether” Laws 
included only statutes, or also “perhaps the Constitution, treaties, common law, or the law of 
nations”).   
 137. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 410–11 (1928) (emphasis added). 
 138. Faithfully, 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J.F. 
& C. Rivington 6th ed. 1785).  
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duties; without failure of performance; honestly; exactly.”139 These 
definitions are also consistent with modern-day definitions of 
“faithfully.”140 
Thus, on its face, the Take Care Clause undoubtedly requires 
“honesty.”141 But it also suggests a requirement that some sort of 
reasonable inquiry be undertaken to find the relevant facts. After all, 
in order to avoid a “failure of performance,” some action must be 
“performed.” If this is correct, then based on the text of the Take Care 
Clause, where a law provides that a power is contingent on the 
President first making a factual determination, to “execute” that law 
“faithfully,” the factfinding must be done, at the least, “honestly,” and 
with some sort of “performance,” if not “exactly.”142  
This requirement of “performance” or “exact[itude]” suggests 
that the President must engage in some sort of reasonable inquiry—
some process—to find these facts.143 Although one might define 
“reasonable inquiry” in any number of ways, I mean it to suggest that 
the President is obligated to consider available, or reasonably available, 
information at her disposal. Of course, what is “reasonable” in this 
context might be debatable. In some instances, the facts might be so 
 
 139. Faithfully, 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(New York, S. Converse 1828); see also Kent, Leib & Shugerman, supra note 136 (manuscript at 
8) (“Our first finding, consistent with usage reported in contemporaneous dictionaries, is that 
faithful execution was repeatedly associated in statutes and other legal documents with true, 
honest, diligent, due, skillful, careful, good faith, and impartial execution of law or office.”); id. at 
20 & nn. 99–100 (listing Founding-era dictionary definitions of “faithfully”).   
 140. See, e.g., Faithfully, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 680 (2d ed. 1989) (including in 
definition: “assuredly, in truth,” and “with strict adherence to duty, conscientiously”); Faithfully, 
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1998) (including in definition: “strict 
or thorough in the performance of a duty”; “true to one’s word, promises, vows”; and “reliable, 
trusted, or believed”); Faithful, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1981) 
(including in definition: “firm in adherence to promises, oaths, or undertakings: firm and thorough 
in the observance of duty: conscientious”). 
 141. See also The President and Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624, 626 (1823) (stating 
that performance of duties “faithfully” means “honestly: not with perfect correctness of judgment, 
but honestly”).  
 142. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 36, at 799 (“The Take Care Clause is thus naturally 
read as an instruction or command to the President to put the laws into effect, or at least to see 
that they are put into effect, ‘without failure’ and ‘exactly.’ ” (quoting Faithfully, 1 SAMUEL 
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J & P Knapton et al. 1755))); 
Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 133, at 1857–58 (“[T]he Take Care Clause might be understood 
as an instruction to the President to ensure that the laws are implemented honestly, effectively, 
and without failure of performance.”). 
 143. This is also consistent with what Kent, Leib, and Shugerman have called a “duty of 
diligence” implicit in the “faithful execution” language of the Take Care Clause. See Kent, Lieb & 
Shugerman, supra note 136 (manuscript at 10, 66, 75); see also id. at 75 (“The implication here is 
that faithful execution requires affirmative effort on the part of the President to pursue diligently 
and in good faith the interests of the principal or purpose specified by the authorizing instrument 
or entity.”). 
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obvious as to require little or no consultation, but in others, the 
factfinding would require, at the least, consideration of evidence 
already at the executive branch’s disposal, as well as an effort to garner 
relevant evidence when doing so is reasonable in relation to the 
governmental interest at stake. “[P]erforming” the factfinding duty 
need not require going to the ends of the earth, but doing the sort of 
investigation any reasonable person would do to ensure that the facts 
found were found “faithfully”—that is, honestly, without failure of 
performance, exactly. Of course “reasonable inquiry” and “honesty” are 
capacious terms, and it is hard to definitively identify what would be 
required to satisfy them. Yet, capaciously defined terms are hardly new 
to constitutional law and often do have bite.144  
In short, the text of the Take Care Clause as applied to 
presidential factfinding powers supports the notion that the President 
must find facts “honestly” and based on “reasonable inquiry.”145  
B. Structure 
1. General Structural Reasons 
Requiring the President to be honest and engage in reasonable 
inquiry in conducting factfinding is also implicit in the Constitution’s 
separation of executive, legislative, and judicial power.146 The President 
executes the law; she does not create it. If the law requires her to find 
particular facts in order to exercise a power, but she need not be honest 
 
 144. Cf. Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1267 (1975): 
My rather enigmatic title, “Some Kind of Hearing,” is drawn from an opinion by Mr. 
Justice White . . . . He stated, “The Court has consistently held that some kind of 
hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property 
interests.” The Court went on to hold that the same not altogether pellucid requirement 
prevailed where the deprivation was of liberty.  
(quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557–58 (1974)). 
 145. Indeed, such a duty to be honest and engage in reasonable inquiry seems to me to be a 
much more straightforward inference from the Take Care Clause than some of the powers—like 
removal of officers or control of executive prosecution—that the clause has been said to include. 
 146. John Manning has argued that, contrary to mainstream theories of separation of powers, 
there is no freestanding separation of powers doctrine in the Constitution. See John F. Manning, 
Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939 (2011). Because this Part 
gives a positive, descriptive account of what obligations apply to the President, I assume for 
purposes of this Article that the separation of powers principles relied on by the Court govern. See, 
e.g., Metzger, supra note 127, at 83–84 (discussing Manning’s work, but noting that general 
separation of powers principles “remain[ ] . . . a basic aspect of the Court’s jurisprudence on 
constitutional structure”); see also N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 
57 (1982) (“[T]he Framers provided that the Federal Government would consist of three distinct 
Branches, each to exercise one of the governmental powers recognized by the Framers as 
inherently distinct.”).  
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or engage in any inquiry in finding those facts, it is hard to see how she 
is executing the law, rather than operating on her own notions of when 
power ought to be exercised. In such a world, the President would, in 
effect, be determining which facts give her authority to act—an act of 
making law, rather than execution.147 This would be inconsistent with 
basic notions of separation of powers that lie at the core of the 
constitutional structure.148 If the Constitution or Congress gives the 
President authority to act only upon her making certain factual 
determinations, then she must do so honestly and reasonably in order 
to call such factfinding “execution” at all.  
Another way to think of this is that if the President exercises 
authority contingent on finding facts, and those facts are found 
dishonestly or arbitrarily, then the President does not have authority 
to act at all.149 As Justice Cardozo put it, “If legislative power is 
delegated subject to a condition, it is a requirement of constitutional 
government that the condition be fulfilled. In default of such fulfillment, 
there is in truth no delegation, and hence no official action, but only the 
vain show of it.”150 If factfinding is done dishonestly or arbitrarily, then 
the condition in question has not been fulfilled, and the authority to act 
does not exist. 
A requirement of honesty and reasonable inquiry in factfinding 
is further supported by the Constitution’s general aversion to arbitrary 
exercises of governmental power. As Lisa Bressman has argued, the 
basic structural features of the Constitution sought to ensure that the 
government did not act arbitrarily.151 Government action must thus be 
for an “adequate, public-regarding purpose.”152 But if the President 
finds facts in order to exercise authority dishonestly or without 
reasonable inquiry, then such factfinding is arbitrary—it has no 
 
 147. Cf. Daniel Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 
TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1152 (2014) (“In practice, complete power to post the relevant facts would be 
little different from complete power to specify the legal standard.”). 
 148. See supra note 146. 
 149. See Stack, Reviewability, supra note 10, at 1199 (“[A] basic premise of constitutional 
law . . . is that every public actor must have legal authorization for his or her actions; without 
authority from either a constitutional or statutory source, the official has no authority to act.”). 
 150. Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 448 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
 151. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 499–500 (2003) (“[S]eparation of powers was intended 
not merely to require Congress and the President to act independently of one another, but also to 
act in a nonarbitrary, public-regarding manner.”); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and 
Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1533–34 (1991) (“[T]he doctrine of the separation of 
powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the 
exercise of arbitrary power.” (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 152. Bressman, supra note 151, at 496, 498.  
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“adequate, public-regarding purpose”; its conclusions are not predicated 
on adequate evidence.153 Such factfinding is no better than “because the 
President said so.”154   
Requiring honesty and reasonable inquiry in finding facts is also 
required by fundamental rule of law norms.155 As Louis Jaffe put it: 
The “law” does not operate in a vacuum. The application of law requires a factual 
predicate; an action without such a predicate is lawless. A finding of fact which is based 
on no more than the will or desire of the administrator is lawless in substance if not in 
form.156 
Although Jaffe’s conclusion is focused on administrative agencies, there 
is no reason why this point should not apply to the President herself.157 
Requiring the President be honest and engage in reasonable inquiry in 
finding facts protects against her premising factual findings on “no 
more than [her] will or desire.”158  
2. The President as Information-Gatherer 
Apart from these general structural reasons, this duty is also 
supported by functional considerations underlying specific provisions of 
the Constitution. Several clauses in the Constitution require the 
President to gather information and convey it to Congress. The State of 
the Union Clause requires the President to “from time to time give to 
the Congress Information of the State of the Union,”159 and the 
Recommendations Clause requires that the President “recommend to 
 
 153. See id. at 496 (stating that government officials act arbitrarily when they are “not 
rational, predictable, or fair,” or when they “generate[ ] conclusions that do not follow logically 
from the evidence”); see also ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 91–92 (1913) (“A 
finding without evidence is arbitrary and baseless.”). 
 154. Ganesh Sitaraman, Foreign Hard Look Review, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 489, 526 (2014) (“A 
simple because the ‘President said so’ would be arbitrary.”). 
 155. Of course, there is no “rule-of-law” clause in the Constitution, cf. Cass Sunstein & Adrian 
Vermeule, The Morality of Administrative Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1937 (2018), but 
interpreters frequently rely on rule-of-law notions in constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., 
Bressman, supra note 151, at 496; Kagan, supra note 123, at 2351 (suggesting that “rule of law 
principles” prevent all exercises of presidential authority from falling outside judicial control); 
Masur, supra note 10, at 483 (“Judicial guardianship over the ‘rule of law’ demands meaningful 
inquiry into the factual predicates of executive action.”).  
 156. JAFFE, supra note 28, at 595. 
 157. Cf. Masur, supra note 10, at 492 (“No principled line exists to confine hard look review to 
the domain of administrative agencies.”). Indeed, we might want more, not less, process for the 
President than for agency heads. See infra text accompanying notes 249–251 (noting that more 
process might be justified because of the breadth and scope of the presidential power and lack of 
judicial review).  
 158. Cf. JAFFE, supra note 28, at 595 (“A finding of fact which is based on no more than the 
will or desire of the administrator is lawless in substance if not form.”). 
 159. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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[Congress’s] Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary 
and expedient.”160   
As early constitutional commentators pointed out, these clauses 
were premised on the notion that the President had superior access to 
information and therefore should be required to convey it to 
Congress.161 In a recent opinion on the Recommendations Clause, OLC 
relied on this rationale, noting that the President was obligated to 
recommend legislation he deemed necessary and expedient because 
[the Founders] believed that, “[f]rom the nature and duties of the executive department, 
he must possess more extensive sources of information . . . than can belong to congress,” 
and so must be uniquely equipped “at once to point out the evil [that merits a legislative 
response], and to suggest the remedy.’ 162  
This conception of the President as better able to gather information is 
further supported by standard justifications for judicial and 
congressional deference to the executive, which rely on the executive’s 
ostensible superior ability to gather facts.163  
This notion that the President is better able to gather 
information and ought to be required to convey it to Congress seems to 
assume a fortiori that she do so honestly and with reasonable inquiry. 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 172 
(Philadelphia, Phillip H. Nicklin, Law Bookseller, 2d ed. 1829):  
[He is] supplied by his high functions with the best means of discovering the public 
exigencies, and promoting the public good, he would not be guiltless . . . if he failed to 
exhibit on the first opportunity, his own impressions of what it would be useful to do, 
with his information of what had been done. 
JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1555, at 413 
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (“There is great wisdom . . . in requiring[ ] the president to lay 
before congress all facts and information, which may assist their deliberations . . . .”). 
 162. Application of the Recommendations Clause to Section 802 of the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 40 Op. O.L.C., 2016 WL 10590110, at *5 
(2016) (quoting STORY, supra note 161, § 1555, at 412–13) (second and third alterations in 
original). 
 163. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (“[The 
President], not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in 
foreign countries.”); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
1607, 1608 (2016) (“Of the three branches of the national government, the Executive is by far the 
most knowledgeable . . . .”). But see, e.g., Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the 
National Security Constitution, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1549, 1567 (2009) (“[T]here is nothing inherent 
in the structural constitutional design of Congress that prohibits it from getting independent 
information, or even from sharing access to information that the executive has . . . .”). The 
Opinions Clause provides further support for this notion by giving the President the authority to 
ask subordinates for information in their relevant areas of expertise. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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C. Supreme Court Precedent  
A requirement of honesty and reasonable inquiry in factfinding 
is also supported by Supreme Court case law. Although the Court has 
never directly addressed the President’s obligations in finding facts, 
numerous precedents strongly suggest that the Court has viewed the 
President’s factfinding duties as requiring honesty and reasonable 
inquiry.  
This is particularly true in the nondelegation doctrine domain, 
where the Court has repeatedly upheld delegations of factfinding 
authorities on the notion that the President had to “ascertain” the 
relevant fact in order to exercise the authority.164 Such “ascertainment” 
seems to assume honesty and reasonable inquiry. For example, in 
Field v. Clark, the Court rejected an argument that a statute requiring 
the President to suspend duty-free status on certain goods if he 
determined that a foreign government had imposed duties that he 
“deem[ed] to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable” violated the 
nondelegation doctrine.165 The Court noted that “[t]he words ‘he may 
deem’ . . . of course implied that the president would examine the 
commercial regulations” of the relevant countries “and form a judgment 
as to whether they were reciprocally equal and reasonable, or the 
contrary.”166 It ultimately held that there was no nondelegation 
problem, as  
the suspension was absolutely required when the president ascertained the existence of 
a particular fact, it cannot be said that in ascertaining that fact, and in issuing his 
proclamation, in obedience to the legislative will, he exercised the function of making 
laws . . . . He was the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and declare 
the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect.167 
In short, the Court assumed that the President was required to 
“examine” certain regulations in order to “ascertain” the relevant facts. 
Clearly the Court assumed that the President had to be honest and 
engage in reasonable inquiry in doing so. 
Indeed, this reasoning underpins many of the Court’s 
nondelegation cases, where the Court has assumed that if the President 
is required to find facts to exercise authority, the President’s duty is to 
“ascertain” whether they exist.168 In short, Congress has a long history 
 
 164. See infra note 168. 
 165. Marshall Field & Co. v Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 680 (1892). 
 166. Id. at 693 (quoting Tariff Act of 1890, § 3, 26 Stat. 567, 612). 
 167. Id.  
 168. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 104 (1943) (“The essentials of the 
legislative function are preserved when Congress authorizes a statutory command to become 
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of delegating authority to the President contingent on finding facts, and 
the Court has held that such factfinding authority is constitutional 
precisely because it viewed the President as obligated to be honest and 
engage in reasonable inquiry in finding the relevant facts.   
Of course, the modern nondelegation doctrine is famously 
“toothless.”169 The Court has stated that “[o]nly if we could say that 
there is an absence of standards for the guidance of the [President]’s 
action, so that it would be impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain 
whether the will of Congress has been obeyed, would we be justified in 
overriding [the statute].”170 Yet, if the President need not be honest or 
engage in any reasonable inquiry in conducting factfinding, not even 
this minimal standard would be met. In such a situation, there would 
be an “absence of standards” guiding the President’s actions. In short, 
if the President need not be honest or engage in any reasonable inquiry 
in finding facts authorizing her to act, she is not constrained at all by 
the facts the law dictates she must find. In such a world, she is not 
executing that law, but making it—or, perhaps more to the point, 
breaking it.171  
A duty to be honest and engage in reasonable inquiry is also 
implicit in the Court’s presumption of regularity cases. In Martin v. 
Mott, the Court rejected a challenge to President Madison’s having 
called forth the militia on the basis of his finding that the United States 
was “in imminent danger of invasion” from a foreign nation.172 Refusing 
 
operative, upon ascertainment of a basic conclusion of fact by a designated representative of the 
Government.”); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 444 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (“The will 
to act being declared, the law presumes that the declaration was preceded by due inquiry and that 
it was rooted in sufficient grounds.”); id. at 437–38 (“He is to study the facts objectively, the 
violation of a standard impelling him to action or inaction according to its observed effect upon 
industrial recovery . . . .”); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 410–11 (1928) 
(“What the President was required to do was merely in execution of the act of Congress. It was not 
the making of law. He was the mere agent of the lawmaking department to ascertain and declare 
the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect.”). Indeed, part of the reason the Court 
struck down the law in Schechter Poultry that permitted the President to promulgate codes 
regulating poultry was the lack of requisite process in finding facts. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541 (1935) (noting that, unlike permissible 
delegations, the statute “does not . . . prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states 
of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure”). 
 169. Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1016 (2015). 
 170. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) (emphasis added). 
 171. Cf. Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 431–32: 
To hold that he is free to select as he chooses from the many and various objects 
generally described in the first section, and then to act without making any finding with 
respect to any object that he does select, and the circumstances properly related to that 
object, would be in effect to make the conditions inoperative and to invest him with an 
uncontrolled legislative power. 
 172. 25 U.S. 19, 29–30 (1827).  
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to assess the President’s factfinding, the Court applied a “presumption 
of regularity,” pursuant to which courts assume that when the 
President acts, he does so “in obedience to his duty, until the contrary 
is shown.”173 The Court grounded the presumption in the Take Care 
Clause, noting that the power at issue was vested in the President, 
“whose responsibility for an honest discharge of his official obligations 
is secured by the highest sanctions. He is necessarily constituted the 
judge of the existence of the exigency in the first instance, and is bound 
to act according to his belief of the facts.”174 Thus, although the Court 
declined to review the President’s factfinding, it did so based on the 
presumption that the President would fulfill his constitutional 
obligations to find those facts honestly.175 Justice Cardozo later made 
clear that (at least in his view) the presumption of regularity required 
not just honesty but also some process in making the factual 
determination, noting that “the law presumes that the declaration [at 
issue in Mott] was preceded by due inquiry and that it was rooted in 
sufficient grounds.”176 In short, although the presumption of regularity 
primarily serves to shield executive branch decisionmaking from 
judicial review, its very premise is that such lack of review is justified 
by the “presumption” that the President will fulfill his duties of finding 
facts honestly and with reasonable inquiry.177  
This duty also finds support from a perhaps surprising place: the 
Supreme Court’s recent opinion in the so-called Travel Ban case. There, 
President Trump exercised statutory authority to suspend the entry of 
certain classes of aliens, upon “find[ing] that the[ir] entry . . . would be 
detrimental to the interests of the United States.”178 The Court found 
that the President fulfilled the statute’s “sole prerequisite” that he 
“ ‘find[ ]’ that the entry of the covered aliens ‘would be detrimental to 
the interests of the United States,’ ” precisely because of the real-world 
investigation and decisionmaking process the executive branch went 
through before making the finding, repeatedly emphasizing the depth 
 
 173. Id. at 32–33. 
 174. Id. at 31 (emphasis added). 
 175. See Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 399 (1932) (noting that the President’s authority 
to call militia “necessarily implies that there is a permitted range of honest judgment as to the 
measures to be taken” (emphasis added)). 
 176. Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 444 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  
 177. Cf. Stack, Reviewability, supra note 10, at 1173–77 (explaining origins of current doctrine 
that “operates to exclude judicial review of the determinations or findings the President makes to 
satisfy conditions for invoking grants of statutory power”); Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms 
and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2193, 2257 (2018) (suggesting judicial deference is premised 
on notion that “the President is exercising superior institutional resources, and doing so in a 
manner at least minimally responsive to rule-of-law values”). 
 178. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(f) (West 2019). 
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of the “worldwide, multiagency review” that preceded it.179 Thus, 
although the Court was not willing to substantively review the evidence 
underlying the finding, the crux of the Court’s ruling that the finding 
requirement was satisfied was that the finding was predicated on facts 
found through what the Court viewed as robust, executive process.180  
These cases dealt with statutory, not constitutional, authorities 
and are thus admittedly less directly applicable to constitutional 
authorities. However, these cases do not seem to rest on implicit 
statutory intent but rather on the nature of executing the law. The 
fundamental point is that execution of the laws requires good faith 
adherence to them. If a law requires the President to find facts to 
 
 179. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408–09 (2018):  
The President has undoubtedly fulfilled [the] requirement here. He first ordered DHS 
and other agencies to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of every single country’s 
compliance with the information and risk assessment baseline. The President then 
issued a Proclamation setting forth extensive findings describing how deficiencies in 
the practices of select foreign governments . . . deprive the Government of “sufficient 
information to assess the risks [those countries’ nationals] pose to the United States.” 
Based on that review, the President found that it was in the national interest to restrict 
entry of aliens who could not be vetted with adequate information—both to protect 
national security and public safety, and to induce improvement by their home countries. 
(second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 
45161 (Sept. 24, 2017)); id. at 2408, 2412, 2417 (emphasizing “the multi-agency review process”). 
 180. See, e.g., id. at 2421 (“The Proclamation . . . reflects the results of a worldwide review 
process undertaken by multiple Cabinet officials and their agencies. . . . [I]n each case the 
determinations were justified by the distinct conditions in each country.”). Indeed, the lack of 
process underlying the first two versions of the ban are likely why they were enjoined and what 
led to the review process underlying the third version. See Kate Shaw, Statements and Standards 
in Trump v. Hawaii, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (June 28, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/ 
statements-and-standards-in-trump-v-hawaii [https://perma.cc/5SPZ-Y5VS] (“It was only after 
receiving a clear message that the Administration could only act to restrict immigration following 
a process that involved real inter-agency consultation, and where the order was predicated on some 
genuine national-security need identified by executive-branch officials, that the Administration 
produced the policy under review.”). One might object that the Court failed to assess whether the 
finding was “honest” because it applied an objective, rational basis test to the Establishment 
Clause challenge. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2417. The use of an objective test, however, 
seemed to be based on prudential concerns about the Court’s unwillingness to second-guess the 
President’s factual findings in the national security domain, rather than any sort of endorsement 
of the President’s power to dishonestly find facts. See, e.g., id. at 2419–21 (noting deference to 
national security factual judgments and that there was “persuasive evidence that the [ban] has a 
legitimate grounding in national security concerns”); cf. id. at 2420 (distinguishing Romer v. Evans 
because the amendment at issue in that case “was ‘divorced from any factual context from which 
we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests’ ” (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 
620, 635 (1996))). Indeed, the whole point of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was to emphasize that 
the President is still bound by constitutional duties, even where the Court is not willing to review 
whether they have been honored. See id. at 2423–24 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“There are 
numerous instances in which the statements and actions of Government officials are not subject 
to judicial scrutiny or intervention. That does not mean those officials are free to disregard the 
Constitution and the rights it proclaims and protects.”). 
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exercise authority, in order to execute those laws, the President must 
find those facts honestly and based on reasonable inquiry.  
D. Historical Practice 
A duty to be honest and engage in reasonable inquiry is also 
supported by historical executive branch practice. People are naturally 
wary of recognizing new constitutional duties on the government, but 
this Section shows that there is good evidence that such a duty is not 
new at all. This Section establishes that numerous internal executive 
branch legal interpretations implicitly assumed that the President 
must be honest and ground his factual determinations in available 
evidence and that this duty has been abided by in at least some high-
profile exercises of presidential authority.  
That said, the point of this Section is not to provide a full 
historical account of how presidents have found facts since the 
Founding era sufficient to provide definitive “historical gloss” on the 
Constitution’s meaning.181 As I have explained elsewhere, although 
historical practice can be relevant to constitutional interpretation in 
certain situations, we must engage in a careful contextual inquiry 
before inferring from the fact that a branch has acted in a certain way 
that the branch viewed that action as constitutionally obligatory.182 
Such a comprehensive inquiry is necessarily outside the scope of this 
Section. The hope of this Section, instead, is to provide evidence that 
such a duty would not be wholly novel or burdensome. To the contrary, 
there is good evidence that at least some prominent attorneys general 
and presidents believed that the President must be honest and engage 
in reasonable inquiry in finding facts. 
Since the Founding era, executive branch lawyers have 
frequently assumed that presidents must be honest and ground their 
findings in available evidence. In an 1823 opinion, Attorney General 
William Wirt concluded that the Take Care Clause required the 
President to ensure that subordinate officers executed the law 
“faithfully—that is, honestly”—and that if the President was made 
aware of any malfeasance he would be “constitutionally bound to look 
 
 181. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of 
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012) (assessing use of “historical gloss” arguments in separation 
of powers debates). 
 182. See generally Shalev Roisman, Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668 
(2016). 
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to the case” to ensure the malfeasance was corrected.183 An 1853 
Attorney General Opinion suggested that before granting a pardon 
prior to a conviction, “[t]here must be satisfactory evidence of some kind 
as to the guilt of the party,” suggesting a requirement that an inquiry 
into the facts be made.184 Four years later, the Attorney General 
suggested that the President had a duty to inquire into the fitness of 
certain individuals he intended to appoint as officers, noting that such 
an inquiry “may depend, on a mass of facts, covering more or less of 
time, and constituting the history of the person. These facts it is the 
duty of the President, in all cases of nomination to office, to determine 
as he best may, by personal or by communicated knowledge.”185 An 1860 
Attorney General Opinion on the eve of the Civil War concluded that, 
before calling forth the militia pursuant to a finding that the laws of the 
United States could not be enforced by ordinary judicial proceedings, 
their “incapacity to cope . . . shall be plainly demonstrated. It is only 
upon clear evidence to that effect that a military force can be called into 
the field.”186 Thus, even in dire circumstances, the Attorney General 
seemed to assume a duty to be honest and engage in reasonable inquiry 
in finding facts.  
In 1881, the Attorney General again seemed to assume the 
President would act honestly and based on reasonable inquiry before 
finding predicate facts in concluding that the “President must 
necessarily first ascertain to his own satisfaction” relevant facts 
necessary to drop servicemembers from the army rolls and that the 
“ascertainment” of these facts were placed “wholly in the hands of the 
Chief Executive, who must naturally have been expected to resort to the 
official records of the War Department as one source, at least, of 
information.”187 A 1910 Attorney General Opinion also supports the 
duty. In discussing an authority allowing the President to impose a 
tariff regime if he determined that a German Tax “unduly 
 
 183. The President & Accounting Officers, supra note 141, at 626 (emphasis omitted); see also 
The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482, 489 (1831) (making similar point). 
 184. See Pardoning Power of the President, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 20, 21(1853) (suggesting that the 
prosecutor “be required to communicate any facts, which, in his opinion, may contribute to inform 
the conscience of the President in the premises”); see also Office and Duties of Attorney General, 
6 Op. Att’y Gen. 326, 350 (1854) (“The conscientious determination of [whether to grant pardons] 
requires, generally, the investigation of proceedings in court, and that of questions of law as well 
as of evidence . . . .”). 
 185. The Navy Efficiency Acts, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 335, 351 (1857). 
 186. Power of the President in Executing the Laws, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 522 (1860). 
 187. Case of Walker A. Newton, 17 Op. Att’y Gen. 13, 15 (1881).  
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discriminate[d] against the United States,” the Attorney General noted 
that to make the relevant determination  
[c]learly . . . the President should consider not only the several intricate and subtle 
provisions of the [German law], and their relationship to each other, but also their bearing 
upon the commercial conditions existing between the citizens of this country and the 
owners of potash mines in Germany, and ascertain therefrom whether this provision of 
the German law must and does in fact work a discrimination against the United 
States.188 
The Attorney General added that whether the finding could be made 
“must be determined upon the conditions and facts actually existing.”189  
One of the more explicit statements of a duty to be honest and 
engage in reasonable inquiry in finding facts was penned by Deputy 
Attorney General Nicolas Katzenbach regarding the use of federal 
troops for law enforcement in Mississippi in 1964.190 The memo 
addressed calls by civil rights groups and members of Congress to use 
federal personnel to prevent further violence against civil rights 
workers in Mississippi. Katzenbach explained that the President had 
statutory authority to use military force when the President deemed it 
necessary to enforce federal law,191 but concluded that “in view of the 
extreme seriousness of the use of those [authorities], . . . the 
government should have more evidence than it presently has of the 
inability of state and local officials to maintain law and order—as a 
matter of wisdom as well as of law.”192 Katzenbach thus clearly 
suggested that the President’s factfinding required not only honesty but 
also reasonable inquiry—more investigation had to be done before the 
determination could “as a matter of . . . law” be made. 
This duty is also supported by modern OLC opinions that 
frequently assume the President must “reasonably” make requisite 
factual findings. For example, a 1982 opinion on presidential 
authorities to respond to “Severe Energy Supply Interruptions” noted 
that “[t]he scope of the President’s authority under these statutes 
necessarily depends on the particular facts presented by any future 
petroleum shortage,” and further observed: 
[T]o the extent that the President’s authority under certain statutes rests on a 
discretionary presidential finding . . . that an emergency situation exists or that actions 
 
 188. Potash Mined in Ger.—Antitrust Laws—Discriminatory Exp. Duty, 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 
545, 556–57 (1910).  
 189. Id. 
 190. Use of Marshals, Troops, & Other Fed. Pers. for Law Enf’t in Miss., 1 Supp. Op. O.L.C. 
493 (1964).  
 191. Id. at 496 (discussing authority under 10 U.S.C. §§ 332–333 (1964) (now codified at 10 
U.S.C.A. §§ 252–253 (West 2019))). 
 192. Id. at 498. 
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are necessary and appropriate “in the national interest,” [or] to promote the “national 
defense,” . . . it is impossible to determine in the absence of specific facts when exercise of 
that authority would be consistent with the terms of the statute.193  
Again, OLC was clearly acknowledging that the President’s 
determinations must be honest and grounded in the actual facts at 
issue.194 A 1995 OLC opinion supports this conception quite well. With 
respect to a statute requiring sanctions upon a finding that individuals 
had knowingly contributed to the chemical weapons development of 
certain countries, OLC concluded that “the President has a duty to 
make the determinations specified in the statute if he is presented with 
sufficient evidence to compel [the relevant] conclusion.”195 The opinion 
clearly suggests that the President is obligated to be honest and 
consider available and appropriate evidence before coming to the 
relevant factual conclusion.196   
 
 193. Legal Auths. Available to the President to Respond to a Sever Energy Supply Interruption 
or Other Substantial Reduction in Available Petroleum Prods., 6 Op. O.L.C. 644, 650 (1982). 
 194. See also Adjusting the Census for Recent Immigrants: The Chiles Amendment, 4B Op. 
O.L.C. 816, 818 (1980) (concluding that the President’s authority to call a special census if he 
determined a locality had experienced a surge in legal immigration required the President to 
“attempt accurately to estimate the total population”); April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian 
Chem.-Weapons Facilities, supra note 30, at *10 (“We would not expect that any President would 
use [the] power [of the armed forces] without a substantial basis for believing that a proposed 
operation is necessary to advance important interests of the Nation.”). The notion that the 
President must “reasonably” find relevant facts has also been present in numerous use of force 
opinions by OLC. See, e.g., April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chem.-Weapons Facilities, supra 
note 30, at *22 (“The President reasonably determined that this operation would further important 
national interests in [inter alia] promoting regional stability . . . .”); Deployment of United States 
Armed Forces to Haiti, 28 Op. O.L.C. 30, 32 (2004) (“Thousands of Americans live in Haiti, and 
the President could reasonably conclude that they would be in danger if the country were to 
descend into lawlessness.” (citation omitted)); Auth. to Use Military Force in Libya, supra note 1, 
at *12 (“Based on these factors, we believe the President could reasonably find a significant 
national security interest in preventing Libyan instability from spreading elsewhere in this critical 
region.”). Indeed, even the notoriously executive-power friendly, post–September 11th George W. 
Bush OLC still grounded its conclusions on the notion that the President could make a particular 
factual determination based on particular evidence given to the office. See, e.g., Status of Taliban 
Forces Under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, 26 Op. O.L.C. 1, 2 (2002) (“Based on the 
facts presented to us by [the Department of Defense], we believe that the President has the factual 
basis on which to conclude that the Taliban militia, as a group, fails to meet three of the four GPW 
requirements, and hence is not legally entitled to POW status.”).  
 195. Presidential Discretion to Delay Making Determinations Under the Chem. & Biological 
Weapons Control & Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, 19 Op. O.L.C. 306, 310 (1995) (emphasis 
added). 
 196. OLC explicitly tied its reasoning to J.W. Hampton’s language that  
the President may be considered “the mere agent of the law-making department to 
ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect.” We 
believe that [this statute] casts the President in such a role, and requires him to make 
a determination if the facts available to him establish that the conditions described in 
the statute exist.  
Id. at 309 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United 
States, 276 U.S. 394, 411 (1928)). 
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Apart from these internal executive branch legal opinions, a 
duty to be honest and engage in reasonable inquiry has been followed 
in practice, at least at times. For example, when George Washington 
called out the militia in response to the Whiskey Rebellion, he took 
great care in making the necessary factual findings under the Militia 
Act of 1792.197 Washington relied on letters and affidavits documenting 
that an insurgency existed that could not be “suppressed by the 
ordinary course of judicial proceedings,”198 as well as a detailed report 
requested of Alexander Hamilton on the history of resistance to the 
relevant tax in Pennsylvania.199 The underlying factual finding was 
backed up by then-Attorney General William Bradford, who based his 
support on “an attentive consideration of the affidavits and documents 
which have been laid before the President.”200 So earnestly did the 
cabinet seem to take the factfinding that Bradford went out of his way 
to disclaim any reliance on rumors that the British had been supporting 
the insurgents, because he did not think the allegations “sufficiently 
proved to be a ground of acting upon.”201 In short, despite the 
seriousness of the situation, Washington appeared to exhibit a strong 
desire to be honest and engage in reasonable inquiry in finding the 
relevant facts authorizing him to call forth the militia.202  
President Roosevelt also seemed to abide by such a duty in the 
lead up to America’s entry into World War II. Roosevelt wanted to send 
a number of destroyers and mosquito boats to England to aid in the war 
effort but was told by then-Attorney General Robert Jackson that such 
a deal was barred by a statutory provision providing that no ships could 
 
 197. In particular, that the laws of the United States were “opposed, or the execution thereof 
obstructed . . . by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial 
proceedings” and that such a state of affairs was certified to the President by an Associate Justice. 
Act of May 2, 1792, § 2, 1 Stat. 264.  
 198. See Letter from Henry Knox, U.S. Sec’y of War, to George Washington, U.S.  
President (Aug. 4, 1794), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-16-02-0354 
[https://perma.cc/6M6P-QHLJ]. Knox noted that the papers and affidavits from people on the 
ground left “no doubt on the mind that the [requisite] opposition and combination . . . really exist.” 
Id.  
 199. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury, to George Washington, 
U.S. President (Aug. 5, 1794), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-16-02-0357 
[https://perma.cc/7UV3-NCQC] (providing such a report).  
 200. Letter from William Bradford, U.S. Att’y Gen., to George Washington, U.S.  
President (Aug. 5, 1794), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-16-02-0356 
[https://perma.cc/X6WJ-WSVZ].  
 201. Id. (emphasis omitted).  
 202. See also Andrew Kent & Julian Davis Mortensen, Executive Power and National Security 
Power, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 261, 266 (Karen 
Orren & John W. Compton eds., 2018) (“The story of the Whiskey Rebellion, in short, is one of a 
famously vigorous leader adhering to statutory limits in exacting detail, regardless of the 
inconvenience involved.”). 
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be transferred or exchanged unless they could be certified as “not 
essential to the defense of the United States.”203 Roosevelt refused to 
approve the deal until he could legitimately conclude that the 
destroyers were “not essential”—a task accomplished by taking into 
account the use of bases the United States would receive in exchange 
for sending the destroyers, along with the benefits to the United States 
of the British having access to them.204 “The prospect of a true 
exchange—the ships would be given in return for the important 
defensive outposts in the Caribbean that England possessed—was 
critical.”205 Indeed, although Churchill strongly opposed having to 
provide any bases in exchange for the destroyers, Roosevelt refused to 
budge.206 Churchill ultimately relented, and Jackson issued a published 
opinion relying, in crucial part, on the exchange rationale.207 Whatever 
the validity of Jackson’s reading of the statute, the point is that, despite 
the high stakes, the President and his administration were not willing 
to find the relevant facts required to authorize the exchange of 
destroyers without adequate support. A duty to be honest and engage 
in reasonable inquiry was abided by. 
As a final anecdotal example, before President Truman seized 
the steel mills, prompting the famous Youngstown case, he collected 
detailed findings and affidavits to support his factual claim that there 
was actually an emergency necessitating the seizure of the steel 
mills.208 The clear intent was to show that he was not simply making 
up the emergency—that he honestly believed it was an emergency and 
 
 203. See, e.g., DAVID J. BARRON, WAGING WAR: THE CLASH BETWEEN PRESIDENTS AND 
CONGRESS 1776 TO ISIS 237–39 (2016) (discussing interactions between Roosevelt and Jackson 
during the deal).  
 204. See id. at 240–50 (discussing the Roosevelt administration’s decisionmaking process in 
approving the deal). 
 205. Id. at 244. 
 206. Instead, he had Jackson explain to Churchill that “American law . . . required a quid pro 
quo exchange.” Id. at 249.  
 207. Id. at 249–50. 
 208. Indeed, the first thing the dissent did was emphasize that there was ample factual basis 
underlying President Truman’s finding that seizing the steel mills was necessary to avert an 
emergency. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 569, 678–79 (1952) 
(Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (reviewing multiple affidavits filed by “Government officials describing 
the facts underlying the President’s order,” and concluding that “the uncontroverted affidavits in 
this record amply support the finding that ‘a work stoppage would immediately jeopardize and 
imperil our national defense’ ” (quoting Exec. Order No. 10340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (Apr. 8, 1952))). 
And in upholding the President’s actions, Chief Justice Vinson repeatedly emphasized that the 
President’s factual finding was amply supported, noting that “[w]e do not now have before us the 
case of a President acting solely on the basis of his own notions of the public welfare,” id. at 701, 
that “[t]here is no judicial finding that the executive action was unwarranted because there was 
in fact no basis for the President’s finding of the existence of an emergency,” id. at 709, and that 
“[n]o basis for claims of arbitrary action, unlimited powers or dictatorial usurpation of 
congressional power appears from the facts of this case,” id. at 710.  
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that the determination had been made upon rigorous process and 
investigation.    
In short, although I am not aware of an Attorney General or OLC 
opinion directly addressing the President’s factfinding duties, the 
executive branch has seemingly long evinced an acceptance of a duty to 
be honest and engage in reasonable inquiry in finding facts that are 
predicates to exercising power. This is not to say that this duty was 
always abided by. It was not, as I will soon discuss. But examples of 
failure to adhere to the duty are not inconsistent with an executive 
branch view that such a duty exists. But we need not take the point that 
far. As noted above, this compilation of historical practice is not meant 
to provide conclusive evidence of “historical gloss” but rather to bolster 
the arguments for such a duty made above and provide evidence that 
such a duty would not be entirely novel. The foregoing has hopefully 
established that. 
E. Does the Duty Have Bite? 
In the sections above, I have tried to establish that the President 
must be honest and engage in reasonable inquiry in finding facts that 
are predicates to exercising authority. One natural response might be: 
So what? “Honesty” and “reasonable inquiry” hardly seem like the most 
onerous obligations. But this standard is not illusory. Such a standard 
would render the exercise of presidential authority unconstitutional, or 
otherwise unlawful, when the factfinding serving as a predicate for such 
authority is dishonest or conducted without reasonable inquiry—i.e., 
without consideration of reasonably available evidence. And 
unfortunately, there is a long history of presidents failing to meet even 
these relatively modest standards.  
For example, both Presidents Madison and Monroe purportedly 
lied about facts that ostensibly permitted them to take over West and 
East Florida, respectively.209 President Polk purportedly lied about 
 
 209. See, e.g., Peter W. Morgan, The Undefined Crime of Lying to Congress: Ethics Reform and 
the Rule of Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 177, 223 (1992) (“President James Monroe . . . lied to Congress 
about his purportedly ‘defensive’ seizure of East Florida—part of a covert plan to acquire the 
territory as ‘indemnity’ for supposed Spanish outrages.”); id. (“President James Madison lied to 
Congress about the U.S. takeover of West Florida.”); Abraham D. Sofaer, Executive Power and the 
Control of Information: Practice Under the Framers, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1, 24–28 (1977) (describing 
President Madison’s false claim to Congress that he seized West Florida because “Spanish 
authority had been subverted” and seizure was “required to assure control of an area”); id. at 33–
45 (describing President Monroe’s claim that then-General Andrew Jackson had occupied East 
Florida as an “act of self-defense, additionally justified by Spain’s failure to meet its treaty 
obligation to restrain the Indians in Florida from hostile acts against the United States,” as highly 
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whether Mexico had attacked the United States on American soil 
leading to American use of force.210 President Lyndon Johnson 
purportedly lied about the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which led to the first 
bombing attacks on North Vietnam and ultimately to congressional 
authorization for the war in Vietnam.211 Johnson also reportedly lied 
about the reasons for the use of troops in the Dominican Republic.212 
And, of course, President Nixon lied about a great many things, 
including that he had national security predicates to justify the 
Watergate break-in and “black bag” jobs against antiwar groups and 
that the bombing of Laos and Cambodia was based on military 
necessity.213 More recently, President Trump has been accused of lying 
or failing to have any reasonable process in a number of matters, 
including the initial versions of the Travel Ban and Transgender 
Military Ban.214  
In short, when presidents lie or act arbitrarily, they violate their 
duty to find facts honestly and with reasonable inquiry. There will 
always be line-drawing problems about precisely when a President has 
been dishonest,215 or when there has been a “lack of reasonable 
inquiry,”216 but we know that presidents lie or arbitrarily find facts at 
 
questionable given private correspondence between Jackson and Monroe suggesting occupation 
was not required by self-defense). 
 210. ERIC ALTERMAN, WHEN PRESIDENTS LIE: A HISTORY OF OFFICIAL DECEPTION AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES 16 (2004) (“In fact, no war with Mexico had existed until President James K. Polk 
falsely insisted that the southern nation had attacked an American army detachment on American 
soil.”). 
 211. HAROLD H. BRUFF, UNTRODDEN GROUND: HOW PRESIDENTS INTERPRET THE 
CONSTITUTION 319 (2015); DAVID WISE, THE POLITICS OF LYING: GOVERNMENT DECEPTION, 
SECRECY, AND POWER 43–47 (1973). 
 212. BRUFF, supra note 211, at 323 (“Johnson misled Congress and the public by claiming the 
intervention was an attempt to protect American lives [following a coup], when it was in fact 
actuated by a concern that the new government might be leftist.”). 
 213. JOHN M. ORMAN, PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY AND DECEPTION: BEYOND THE POWER TO 
PERSUADE 125–126 (1980); David E. Hoffman, Secret Archive Offers Fresh Insight into Nixon 
Presidency, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/ 
wp/2015/10/11/secret-archive-offers-fresh-insight-into-nixon-presidency [https://perma.cc/92PW-
GBK9] (stating that Nixon knew bombing Laos and Cambodia was not militarily effective but 
justified it as based on military necessity).  
214. See infra note 229 (discussing Travel Ban); supra note 22 (discussing Transgender 
Military Ban). 
 215. Cf., e.g., Helen Norton, The Government’s Lies and the Constitution, 91 IND. L.J. 73, 77–
78 (2015) (“[D]eterminations of what is (and is not) a lie in a particular situation can be deeply 
contested . . . .”). 
 216. Not all historical claims of presidents acting on false premises arose from outright 
dishonesty. Some arose from a deliberate failure to investigate facts motivated by fear of finding 
out something the President did not want to know. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 209, at 19–23 
(describing how Madison accepted the French claim that American ships would not be interfered 
with, despite reports of continuing interference, because it would allow him to issue proclamation 
that France had stopped interfering with American ships in order to pressure Britain). 
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times, and this Part has sought to establish that when they do, they 
violate the law. 
 III. REGULATING PRESIDENTIAL FACTFINDING 
Now that the descriptive scope of presidential factfinding and 
the existing positive legal obligations on the President have been 
identified, we can turn to how presidential factfinding ought to be 
conducted in a normatively desirable way. How ought the President find 
facts, and how ought the President’s factfinding be reviewed in order to 
best ensure she abides by her constitutional duty to be honest and 
engage in reasonable inquiry? This Part seeks to make progress in 
answering these questions by exploring how presidential factfinding 
ought to be regulated through internal executive branch structures, 
congressional regulation, and judicial review.  
A. Executive Branch Regulation of Presidential Factfinding 
In 1942, in discussing factfinding in the burgeoning 
administrative state, Kenneth Culp Davis stated that  
no one who studies the administrative process would attempt to draw a line through the 
multifarious fact-finding functions and say: “Now, this is adjudication; here we must have 
some system of evidence. That, on the other hand, is legislative (or executive, or 
administrative, or unclassifiable); therefore fact-finding may be carried on without any 
rules of evidence and without anything to take their place.”217  
The point Davis was making is intuitive and important. When someone 
is tasked with finding facts in order to exercise authority, there ought 
to be some system in place that governs how those facts are found. Yet, 
for presidential factfinding, there often appears to be no such system. 
This lack of preset process is particularly worrisome given the broad 
range of power the President possesses. In response to this state of 
affairs, this Section seeks to make progress in identifying how 
presidential factfinding ought to be conducted to best ensure the 
President abides by her duty to honestly and reasonably find facts. It 
first examines the current state of affairs, pursuant to which there often 
appears to be no preset process or standard of certainty, and then 
addresses what processes and standards of certainty the President 
ought to use in finding facts.  
 
 217. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 
55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 367 (1942). 
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1. Process 
What process ought the President use in finding facts that serve 
as predicates for exercising power? A definitive answer to this question 
would require assessing a number of factors, including the potential 
benefits and costs of any particular process, the effects such process 
would have on encouraging or discouraging exercises of presidential 
power, the importance of such exercises of presidential power, and so 
on. Because these factors are hard to assess and will often be 
contestable, the aim of this Part is more modest.218 Rather than seeking 
to identify an optimal preset process for presidential factfinding, this 
Part instead seeks first to provide an account of existing practice, 
pursuant to which there often appears to be no preset process for 
finding facts; then, to make an argument that some preset process is 
normatively desirable; and finally, to set forth a preliminary menu of 
options for thinking about how such a process might be structured. It 
concludes by providing a concrete example of what such process might 
look like and by addressing how the costs of such process might be dealt 
with.  
So, how does the President find facts today? The unfortunate 
answer is that we lack any comprehensive account. And because there 
is no systematic mechanism by which factfinding processes are revealed 
to the public, what exists in the public record is dispersed and 
necessarily incomplete. As a result, this Part cannot provide a full 
account of how the President finds facts today but instead surveys what 
can be gleaned from the public record. It reveals that although there 
are examples of publicly known, preset processes for certain instances 
of factfinding, there does not appear to be any sort of generally 
applicable, formal process for how the President finds facts.  
To start, there are some places where the President has 
instituted and made public a fairly robust, preset process for finding 
facts that are used as predicates for exercising power. For example, a 
preset factfinding process has been created for certain decisions 
regarding use of military force against suspected terrorists,219 as well 
 
 218. Cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International Law, 
131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1270 (2018) (noting difficulty of fully assessing institutional reform 
proposals in the context of presidential power). 
 219. See W.H. REPORT, supra note 50, at 24–26:  
[D]ecisions to capture or use lethal force against terrorist targets outside areas of active 
hostilities are made at the most senior levels of the U.S. Government, informed by 
departments and agencies with relevant expertise. [The PPG] sets forth a decision 
making process for operations whereby senior national security officials . . . review and 
inform proposals to ensure that the legal and policy standards are met [and includes] 
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as for making the required statutory findings to authorize “covert 
action.”220 And surely there are other examples of which I am not 
aware.221 But as a general matter, there does not appear to be any sort 
of systematic process for how facts serving as predicates for exercising 
power are found.222  
Indeed, even in areas where exercises of presidential power are 
governed by formal process, the process for how relevant facts are found 
is often unstated. For example, one of the primary forms of exercising 
presidential power is through executive orders and proclamations,223 
 
procedures for after-action reports as well as requirements for congressional 
notification.;  
Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United 
States and Areas of Active Hostilities, WHITE HOUSE 3 (May 22, 2013), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ 
ppd/ppg-procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6TN-BNLA] (setting forth detailed interagency process 
requiring interagency clearance and “at a minimum . . . near certainty that an identified [High 
Value Target] . . . is present . . . [and] near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or 
killed” and, if lethal force is employed, “an assessment that capture is not feasible at the time of 
the operation”).  
 220. To authorize covert action, the President must find that such action is “necessary to 
support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national 
security of the United States.” 50 U.S.C.A. § 3093(a) (West 2019). Presidents have installed a fairly 
robust process for making this finding, which appears to include processes for finding the requisite 
facts. See, e.g., William J. Daugherty, Approval and Review of Covert Action Programs Since 
Reagan, 17 INT’L J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 62, 74–75 (2004) (describing process); 
Samuel J. Rascoff, Presidential Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. 633, 708 (2016) (“[T]he ‘systematic, 
institutionalized process’ underpinning covert action is designed to evaluate ‘effectiveness, risk, 
and policy adherence.’ ” (quoting Daughtery, supra, at 75)). To be sure, scholars debate whether 
the process is rigorous enough, id. at 708 (collecting sources), but the President appears to have 
sufficiently focused on this area to ensure the finding is grounded in, among other things, rigorous 
factfinding. See Daugherty, supra, at 74–75.  
 221. The Obama administration National Security Council’s (“NSC”) governing document 
called for the Deputies Committee to ensure that “all papers to be discussed by the NSC . . . fairly 
and adequately set out the facts.” Presidential Policy Directive – 1: Organization of the National 
Security Council System, WHITE HOUSE 4 (Feb. 13, 2009), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5RXX-YC62] [hereinafter PPD 1]. However, the document does not explain the 
process for how those “facts” are found. Such processes might exist, but I have not found them in 
the public record.  
 222. When the President delegates power to agency heads, their exercise of power is subject to 
the APA’s requirements. See, e.g., Renan, supra note 177, at 2223. Presidential factfinding 
authorities, however, are all directly delegated to the President, not agency heads, and, therefore, 
while the President may choose to exercise some factfinding authorities through agency heads, 
other exercises will not be conducted through agencies. In those contexts, there appears to be no 
systematic, preset process in place that governs how factfinding is conducted. 
 223. See PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE 
DIRECT ACTION 19–115, 171–207 (2014) (discussing executive orders and proclamations as key 
tools of presidential direct action); KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE 
ORDERS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 5 (2001) (noting the historic importance of executive orders); 
Manheim & Watts, supra note 17 (manuscript at 22) (“Executive orders—along with other kinds 
of unilateral written directives, such as those contained in presidential memoranda and 
proclamations—serve as an extraordinarily important tool in the President’s toolkit.”). 
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which frequently rely on factfinding.224 Approval of such directives is 
governed by Executive Order (“E.O.”) 11030, which requires that 
proposed directives be submitted to the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, along with a letter from the authorizing 
official at the originating agency “explaining the nature, purpose, 
background, and effect of the proposed Executive Order or 
proclamation.”225 If the Director approves the proposed order, then it is 
transmitted to the Attorney General for “his consideration as to both 
form and legality,” a review function that has since been delegated to 
OLC.226 While proposed orders often go through interagency clearance 
and review before they are approved, such interagency process is not 
required by the formal document and some directives do not go through 
such review.227 But even for orders that do go through interagency 
review, there does not appear to be any formal process requiring 
articulation of or sign-off on the facts that underlie the exercise of 
authority.  
This failure to require articulation of underlying facts and any 
process to ensure predicate facts are reasonably found in the executive 
order context is perhaps best encapsulated by President Trump’s first 
iteration of the Travel Ban. Although that version was approved for 
“form and legality” by OLC,228 it reportedly was not accompanied by any 
 
 224. As just a sampling, see, for example, Proclamation No. 9687, 82 Fed. Reg. 61,413 (Dec. 
22, 2017) (suspending trade status for Ukraine because it was not “providing adequate and 
effective protection of intellectual property rights”); Exec. Order No. 11,615, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,727 
(Aug. 15, 1971) (invoking authority to impose price, rent, wage, and salary stabilization 
requirements upon concluding they were necessary “to stabilize the economy, reduce inflation, and 
minimize unemployment” and that the “present balance of payments situation ma[d]e[ ] [doing so] 
especially urgent . . . to improve our competitive position in world trade and to protect the 
purchasing power of the dollar”); and Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (Apr. 8, 1952) 
(ordering seizure of steel mills because inter alia “it is necessary that the United States take 
possession of and operate the plants” “in order to assure continued availability of steel . . . during 
the existing emergency”).  
 225. Exec. Order No. 11,030, § 2(a), 27 Fed. Reg. 5847 (June 19, 1962). 
 226. Id. § 2(b); 28 C.F.R. § 0.25(b) (2018) (assigning task to OLC). 
 227. See, e.g., Eliana Johnson et al., Hasty Immigration Order Gives Way to West  
Wing Tensions, POLITICO (June 22, 2018, 9:52 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/22/ 
trumps-quick-fix-on-family-separations-unleashes-internal-tensions-667175 [https://perma.cc/ 
S4ND-NM4T] (describing typical interagency process); cf. MAYER, supra note 223, at 61 
(suggesting such review limited to “particularly complex or far-reaching orders”); Andrew 
Rudalevige, The Contemporary Presidency: Executive Orders and Presidential Unilateralism, 42 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 138, 150 (2012) (suggesting “White House-driven orders” were only 
“usually” subject to such clearance). And some orders skip the formal process altogether. See 
MAYER, supra note 223, at 60–61 (“[W]hen the White House is under time pressure it routinely 
bypasses the formal routine.”). 
 228. Memorandum from Curtis E. Gannon, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen. (Jan. 27, 2017), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3442905/EO-Foreign-Terrorist-Entry.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W632-L6HD]. 
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real internal review to ensure that the factual predicates underlying 
the exercise of authority could justifiably be found.229 In short, even in 
the fairly formal, proceduralized context of executive orders and 
proclamations, ensuring rigorous factfinding appears to be left out of 
the picture.  
Similarly, although a wave of recent scholarship has 
documented how presidential exercises of power are subject to fairly 
rigorous legal review before they are approved,230 it remains unclear 
precisely how this legal review applies to the underlying facts that serve 
as predicates for exercising power. For example, even in OLC’s formal 
opinions, there does not appear to be any uniform approach to vetting 
underlying facts—sometimes the facts are taken as stipulated, in 
reliance on other executive branch actors’ assurances;231 sometimes the 
facts seem to be found implicitly by OLC;232 sometimes OLC simply 
states that the President could reasonably find certain facts as 
 
 229. See Sophia Brill, A Modest Proposal for the New Travel Ban: Swear It Under Oath, 
LAWFARE (Oct. 5, 2017, 10:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/modest-proposal-new-travel-ban-
swear-it-under-oath [https://perma.cc/LDY4-4WKL] (“The first version of this order was issued 
just seven days after President Trump took office, and it banned travel . . . based on no fact-finding 
whatsoever. . . . [The] first order was not even reviewed by national security experts within the 
Department of Justice.”). Of course, because the internal process that order went through has not 
been made public, we cannot be certain what it entailed. But the face of the order itself also does 
not explain what facts supported the finding that the entry of these classes of aliens would be 
“detrimental to the interests of the United States.” See Exec. Order No. 13,769, § 5, 82 Fed. Reg. 
8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
 230. See supra note 9. 
 231. See, e.g., Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, to Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Re: Applicability of Federal Criminal 
Laws and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi 
39 (July 16, 2010), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/aulaqi.pdf [https://perma.cc/NH95-K8KR] 
(“[O]n the facts represented to us, a decision-maker could reasonably decide that the threat posed 
by al-Aulaqi’s activities to United States persons is ‘continued’ and ‘imminent.’ ”); Status of Taliban 
Forces Under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, 26 Op. O.L.C. 1, 2 (Feb. 7, 2002) 
(“Based on the facts presented to us by DoD, we believe that the President has the factual basis 
on which to [make the relevant] conclu[sion].”). 
 232. See, e.g., April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chem.-Weapons Facilities, supra note 30, 
at *21–22 (evaluating “several measures that had been taken to reduce the risk of escalation by 
Syria or Russia” and concluding that the targets selected reduced the “likelihood that Syria would 
retaliate” while deconfliction measures “reduced the possibility that Russia would respond 
militarily”); Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intelligence Authority, Re: 
Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the 
Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee 38 (May 10, 2005), https://www.justice.gov/ 
olc/file/886271/download [https://perma.cc/8L9L-52K5] (“We understand from [the CIA’s Office of 
Medical Services], and from our review of the literature on the physiology of sleep, that even very 
extended sleep deprivation does not cause physical pain, let alone severe physical pain.”); 
Compatibility of N.Y.C. Local Law 19 with Fed. Highway Act Competitive Bidding Requirements, 
10 Op. O.L.C. 101, 106 (1986) (making implicit factual determination about effect of bidding 
processes on federal contract bidding). 
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predicates of authority without explaining whether the President has 
or has not actually found those facts, let alone based on what 
evidence;233 and sometimes OLC concedes it does not have access to 
sufficient information to make a determination.234 Meanwhile, OLC’s 
“form and legality” review of executive orders does not appear to require 
any sort of rigorous review of the facts underlying the order.235 Even 
less is publicly known about how OLC—or other executive branch legal 
decisionmakers—assess underlying factual predicates when giving 
informal legal advice that does not result in a published opinion or 
formal approval.236 In short, although internal executive branch 
lawyers clearly take seriously their task of ensuring the President’s 
exercises of power are legal, the facts to which they apply the law 
appear to be found without any clear, preset process.  
The lack of formal process governing presidential factfinding 
does not necessarily mean that the President typically just makes facts 
up. Existing norms and practices within the executive branch surely do 
sometimes serve to ensure facts are found rigorously. For example, 
Daphna Renan has provided a rich account of how a “deliberative 
presidency” norm that includes “fact-intensive” review of decisions has 
taken root, particularly with respect to national security 
decisionmaking.237 However, even where this norm appears most 
robust—in national security decisionmaking—it is still not clear what 
precise process is used to find underlying factual predicates for 
 
 233. See supra note 194 (listing examples). 
 234. See, e.g., Applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 207(f) to Public Relations Activities Undertaken for 
a Foreign Corp. Controlled by a Foreign Gov’t, 32 Op. O.L.C. 115, 119 (2008) (“We lack sufficient 
information to reach a conclusion about whether the foreign corporation at issue is a ‘foreign entity’ 
for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 207(f).”); Miscellaneous Receipts Act Exception for Veterans’ Health 
Care Recoveries, 22 Op. O.L.C. 251, 251 (1998) (“Because the information that you have provided 
does not allow us to determine the amount of the settlement that was intended to compensate the 
federal government for its claims[,] . . . we are unable to give any more specific guidance on this 
issue.”). 
 235. See, e.g., Letter from Sally Yates, Acting Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3438879/Letter-From-Sally-Yates.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UL9K-VDLG] (“OLC’s review is limited to the narrow question of whether, in 
OLC’s view, a proposed Executive Order is lawful on its face and properly drafted.”). Again, this is 
not to say review of underlying facts never happens as part of this review, just that it does not 
appear to be formally required for sign-off. 
 236. See Erica Newland, I Worked in the Justice Department. I Hope Its Lawyers Won’t Give 
Trump an Alibi, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/i-worked-
in-the-justice-department-i-hope-its-lawyers-wont-give-trump-an-alibi/2019/01/10/9b53c662-
1501-11e9-b6ad-9cfd62dbb0a8_story.html [https://perma.cc/6MRX-BQ9E] (noting that sometimes 
OLC lawyers “wouldn’t look closely at the claims the President was making about the state of the 
world”). 
 237. See Renan, supra note 177, at 2223–30. 
 
Roisman_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 4/28/2019 3:17 PM 
2019] PRESIDENTIAL FACTFINDING 879 
presidential exercises of power.238 And one need not search far to find 
failures to abide by any sort of fact-checking norm, even with regard to 
highly consequential and publicly articulated facts in the national 
security domain.239  
In short, even if there is a relatively robust norm for reviewing 
facts within the executive branch in certain instances, it is not clear 
precisely what that norm requires, which facts are subject to its review, 
which facts are excluded, or how consistently the norm is applied to the 
facts to which it ostensibly applies. Moreover, we know that the norm 
has failed to ensure adequate fact-checking in at least some instances 
where it would be thought to apply. Perhaps most fundamentally, the 
very fact that the internal practice for how facts are found is so unclear 
and untransparent should serve as cause for concern. 
In sum, although some rigorous process is used to find facts in 
some instances, there does not appear to be a formal, preset process for 
how the President finds facts that serve as predicates for exercising 
presidential power. One might be tempted to conclude that this lack of 
formal process is unproblematic, because the President’s accountability 
will sufficiently incentivize finding facts honestly and rigorously in each 
instance. However, this is simply not the case. Presidents are not 
primarily judged on their factfinding abilities but are instead judged on 
 
 238. For example, as noted above, although an Obama administration Presidential Policy 
Directive called for the NSC Deputies Committee to ensure that “all papers to be discussed by the 
NSC . . . fairly and adequately set out the facts,” PPD 1, supra note 221, at 4, it did not clearly set 
out how those facts must be found. 
 239. For example, as part of a rigorous, ex ante factual review of Secretary of State Colin 
Powell’s infamous speech to the UN regarding whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, the 
CIA apparently removed reference to a claim that Iraq had tried to purchase uranium in Africa 
“because [it] d[idn]’t believe it,” but it failed to remove the same factual claim from President 
Bush’s subsequent State of the Union address because the CIA was never made aware that the 
claim would be mentioned. See MICHAEL MORELL & BILL HARLOW, THE GREAT WAR OF OUR TIME: 
THE CIA’S FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM—FROM AL QA’IDA TO ISIS 95 (2015). Similarly, although the 
CIA carefully vetted talking points to be made to Congress shortly after the Benghazi attacks, it 
was unaware of the White House talking points National Security Advisor Susan Rice used on 
national television, which, unlike the CIA-approved talking points, “blam[ed] the Benghazi attack 
on [an anti-Muslim YouTube] video.” Id. at 227–29. The first iteration of the Travel Ban provides 
another example of failure to abide by these norms in that it was issued without any apparent 
checking of the factual predicates thought to authorize the use of presidential power. See supra 
note 229. 
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other metrics,240 and they will therefore often have incentives to skew 
factfinding in the service of these other metrics.241  
Although political accountability could conceivably serve as a 
check on these impulses, it is unlikely to do so systematically, because 
voters are often unlikely to be able to (and will not necessarily want to) 
police faulty presidential factfinding.242 Indeed, of all government 
decisions, factfinding might be the one that the general public is least 
able to police because of its relatively inferior access to information. 
This will be particularly true in the realm of foreign affairs and national 
security due to the secret and sensitive nature of the information.243 
Therefore, to the extent the theory is that the public will reliably hold 
the President accountable for erroneous factfinding and this will spur 
her to systematically find facts accurately, that empirical premise is 
questionable.244 Indeed, even if the public could identify inaccurate 
factfinding, the notion that it would hold the President accountable for 
particular factfindings is not obvious. Much presidential factfinding 
will not be so politically salient as to merit punishment at the ballot box 
for false or arbitrary decisions.245 And even if it is sufficiently salient, 
 
 240. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: 
A Theory, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 850, 854 (1999):  
Broadly speaking, . . . most presidents have put great emphasis on their legacies and, 
in particular, on being regarded in the eyes of history as strong and effective leaders. . . . 
For this they need power . . . . Whatever else presidents might want, they must at 
bottom be seekers of power. 
 241. See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 10, at 1413 (“Institutional incentive structures . . . might 
tend to incentivize inaccurate factfinding . . . .”); Rascoff, supra note 220, at 694–95 (noting the 
“well-known phenomenon of politicization of intelligence”). 
 242. For a terrific summary of existing critiques of accountability, see Jacob E. Gersen & 
Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 185, 187 n.6 (2014). 
 243. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Shalev Roisman, Assessing the Claim that ISIL Is a Successor 
to Al Qaeda—Part 1 (Organizational Structure), JUST SEC. (Oct. 1, 2014), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/15801/assessing-isil-successor-al-qaeda-2001-aumf-part-1-
organizational-structure [https://perma.cc/SBV2-AMUV]: 
Our account has relied on the limited public record. Of course, if we are wrong about 
the facts, our legal analysis may change. What is hard about making a decisive 
assessment either way is that the party probably best able to assess these facts is the 
Administration and it has yet to make either its legal argument or its factual premises 
public. 
 244. Congress, too, might hold the President accountable for her factfinding, but again, there 
is little reason to think it will do so systematically or comprehensively. 
 245. See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 10, at 1430–31 (“[T]he issues [executive branch 
decisionmakers] resolve will vary . . . in terms of their transparency and salience in the public’s 
eye.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Presidential Administration and the Traditions of Administrative Law, 
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1981 (2015):  
[T]o . . . allow large swathes of the administrative state to be taken over by a 
presidential administration subject only to the constraints of public opinion, would 
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voters can only vote for one person, requiring them to bundle their 
concerns in a way that raises difficulties for such an accountability 
dynamic.246 Effective accountability in this context might also present 
normative downsides, by tempting the President to find facts that are 
not objectively true because she thinks the public wants those facts to 
be found, leading to less, not more, objective factfinding.247 In short, it 
is simply not true that presidents have consistent, or sufficient, 
incentives to engage in objective factfinding underlying the use of 
presidential authority in a systematic or comprehensive way.248   
Given that the President will not systematically have sufficient 
incentives to find facts objectively, the stakes should become clear. As 
this Article has sought to show, presidential factfinding is remarkably 
commonplace. Yet, there often appears to be no preset process for how 
the President finds facts that are predicates for exercising authority. 
And while we might be accustomed to the executive branch possessing 
enormous power these days, we generally accept that power in the 
hands of administrative agencies, because they are substantially 
constrained by the procedural strictures of the APA enforced by judicial 
review.249 The President, on the other hand, is not subject to either of 
these constraints—her decisionmaking is not subject to the APA, and, 
as noted above, courts do not typically review presidential 
 
invite arbitrariness and oppression in a vast number of regulatory contexts that fly 
below the radar screen of media attention and public opinion. 
 246. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a 
Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 997–98 (1997) (describing the “bundling problem” 
voters face because they must accept or reject all the President’s policies); Nina A. Mendelson, 
Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1160–61 
(2010) (describing the difficulty of holding the President accountable given low-information voting, 
infrequency of elections, and breadth of issues). 
 247. Cf. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 689 (2000) 
(“[Politicians] are much more likely to consider how the facts appear to the general public than the 
way they look after disciplined and sustained investigation.”); Gersen & Stephenson, supra note 
242, at 195, 198 (describing “pandering”); Kagan, supra note 123, at 2335 (“[M]odern Presidents 
are more often criticized for excessively hewing to, than for blithely disregarding, broad public 
opinion.”). 
 248. To be sure, some facts might be subject to such an accountability dynamic. The facts 
underlying the President’s decision to authorize the raid targeting Osama Bin Laden might be one 
example. See MORELL & HARLOW, supra note 239, at 143–76 (describing decisionmaking process 
regarding presidential approval of targeting Bin Laden and noting that Secretary of Defense Leon 
Panetta made “perhaps the strongest argument” for the strike by stating, “ ‘I’ve always operated 
by a simple test—what would the American people say?’ . . . ‘There is no doubt in my mind that if 
they knew what we know—even with the range of confidence levels we have—that they would 
want us to go after the man responsible for all those deaths on 9/11.’ ”). But there is little reason 
to think that these facts are the norm rather than the exception. 
 249. See, e.g., Stack, Statutory, supra note 17, at 591 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s tolerance of 
broad congressional delegations may be attributable, at least in part, to the greater procedural 
constraints imposed on statutory delegatees.”). 
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factfinding.250 As a result, at present, presidential factfinding appears 
largely unregulated both externally and internally. This raises serious 
risk that the President will be capable of (and, at times, incentivized to) 
find facts arbitrarily in order to exercise authority. Given the breadth 
and scope of presidential authority, a lack of procedures in this area 
thus raises a “particularly intolerable risk of arbitrariness.”251  
Once we recognize this risk, we ought to consider how to 
constrain it. For this normative problem, this Section identifies a 
normatively desirable solution: constructing formal internal executive 
branch processes to help ensure, within reason, that factfinding is 
conducted deliberately and objectively, rather than unthinkingly or 
politically. This solution might also be thought of as one way of 
implementing the President’s positive constitutional duty to be honest 
and engage in reasonable inquiry in finding facts. Although a formal, 
preset process may not be constitutionally required, incorporating such 
a process to ensure objective factfinding occurs would serve as a means 
of ensuring the President is complying with this obligation. 
Creating such a formal, preset process would “routinize” 
factfinding practices in a way that would (if the process is designed 
correctly) encourage objective factfinding.252 Indeed, the notion that 
 
 250. See supra note 17. 
 251. Bressman, supra note 151, at 524; see also Stack, Statutory, supra note 17, at 591 
(“[B]ecause the president has more power than any given agency, the absence of procedural 
formality is more grave.”); cf. Todd D. Rakoff, The Shape of the Law in the American Administrative 
State, 11 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 9, 22–23 (1992) (“If the maxim that the only safe power is divided 
power is indeed a cultural norm, what would be taboo would be the creation of an organ of 
government at once omnipowered and omnicompetent.”); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential 
Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 983 (1997) (“The President as lawmaker is more hazardous 
than [an agency head] as lawmaker, precisely because he is omnicompetent, remote from effective 
check by courts or even Congress.”). 
 252. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 120, at 1924 (“[T]here are benefits to encouraging agencies 
to develop strong decisionmaking structures or to address key issues about the scope of their 
authority ahead of time.”); Rascoff, supra note 220, at 703 (“[A]s presidential intelligence becomes 
a matter of institutional habit within the White House, it will become increasingly difficult to 
operate outside of the internal processes that define it.”); Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in 
American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1870–71 
(2012) (“[O]rganizational structures constrain and regularize agency decisions in the absence of 
direct oversight by either the political branches or the judiciary. This kind of intrinsic discipline is 
of critical importance because the bulk of agency activity takes place outside the glare of political 
or judicial spotlights.”); cf. W.H. REPORT, supra note 50, at i (“Decisions regarding war and peace 
are among the most important any President faces. It is critical, therefore, that such decisions are 
made pursuant to a policy and legal framework that affords clear guidance internally . . . [and] 
reduces the risk of an ill-considered decision.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Remarks: Twenty-First-
Century International Lawmaking, 101 GEO. L.J. 725, 734 (2013) (“Nations tend to obey 
international law, because their government bureaucracies adopt standard operating procedures 
and other internal mechanisms that foster default patterns of habitual compliance with 
international legal rules.”). 
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executive branch actors ought to set ex ante limits on their own 
discretion to limit arbitrary governance has long been a staple of 
administrative law scholarship and (for a time) doctrine.253 Although 
the Supreme Court has held that such a requirement can only be 
imposed by Congress, not courts,254 the basic reasoning underlying the 
idea is generally accepted.255 The basic notion is that imposing ex ante 
procedures on the government’s discretion helps prevent arbitrary 
governmental conduct and promotes good governance.256 This reasoning 
has also formed the basis for critiques regarding the lack of process in 
how agencies and courts find legislative facts.257 If this basic reasoning 
is correct, then providing ex ante procedures for presidential factfinding 
could also help promote good governance and prevent arbitrary 
 
 253. One of the main concerns among administrative law scholars, such as K.C. Davis and 
Henry Friendly, was a lack of standards guiding agency discretion. See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 55 (1969) (“When legislative bodies delegate 
discretionary power without meaningful standards, administrators should develop standards at 
the earliest feasible time.”); see also Bressman, supra note 151, at 529–30 (“Davis and Friendly 
described the problem of arbitrary administrative decisionmaking as the lack of standards 
controlling the exercise of administrative authority.”). The proposed solution was to require 
agencies to supply the standards guiding and limiting their own discretion. Bressman, supra note 
151, at 530. 
 254. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–73 (2001); Vt. Yankee 
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 523–25, 548 (1978) (stating that nothing “permitted 
the court to review and overturn the rulemaking proceeding on the basis of the procedural devices 
employed (or not employed) by the Commission so long as the Commission employed at least the 
statutory minima”); see also Bressman, supra note 151, at 532 (“The Court found illogical the 
notion that agencies possess the power to supply the standards that render their own statutory 
power constitutional.”); Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 155, at 1971 (“[T]he Court [in Vermont 
Yankee] famously ruled that courts may not impose procedural requirements beyond those set out 
in the APA or other sources of positive law.”). 
 255. Cf. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 155, at 1938 (noting that concerns about lack of 
rule-bound discretion “continue to play a significant role” in administrative law even after 
Whitman). 
 256. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“If the agency 
develops determinate, binding standards for itself, it is less likely to exercise the delegated 
authority arbitrarily.”), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Whitman, 531 U.S. 457; see also Bressman, 
supra note 151, at 532–33 (“[I]t is time for administrative law to come to grips with the concept of 
administrative standards. . . . [S]uch standards are necessary to improve the rationality, fairness, 
and predictability . . . of administrative decisionmaking.”). 
 257. See, e.g., 1 DAVIS, supra note 12, § 6:38, at 618 (“When policy choices that affect private 
interest rest heavily upon factual ingredient, as many policy choices do, should a good legal system 
allow any lawmakers to proceed without responsibly marshaling the relevant facts stating them 
and analyzing them, and giving affected parties a chance to respond to them?”); FAIGMAN, supra 
note 12, at 181 (“[A]n informed empirical jurisprudence depends on the systematic use of 
procedural guidelines.”); Gorod, supra note 12, at 9 (“Given th[e] indeterminacy [of many 
legislative facts found by courts], it is problematic when such ‘facts’ are ‘found’ by ad hoc methods 
without the benefit of rigorous testing and then provide the basis for consequential legal 
decisions.”); id. at 73 (“Whatever the best procedures or guidelines might be, some procedures or 
guidelines should exist so that judges . . . do not simply engage in the ad hoc cherry-picking of 
facts . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
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governmental conduct. In short, given the import of how the President 
finds facts, some sort of preset process seems desirable.258  
But what should such a process look like? The, perhaps 
unsatisfying, answer is that “it’s complicated.” Constructing the “best” 
approach for presidential factfinding requires weighing extremely 
contestable costs and benefits that would require far more empirical 
and normative analysis than can be done in the space of this Section.259 
Accordingly, rather than seeking to propose the optimal method for how 
presidential factfinding ought to be constructed, I instead set forth a 
menu of feasible options for decisionmakers to consider, drawing largely 
from the administrative law and institutional design scholarship.260 
One approach would require interagency review of proposed findings of 
fact before they form the predicates for exercising power. This approach 
would have many benefits—including the virtue of aggregating 
information across the executive branch to better inform the relevant 
decisionmaking—but also costs, and therefore any such process would 
need to be carefully calibrated.261 Interagency review could then be 
followed by a requirement that a high-level executive branch official 
 
 258. Indeed, requiring the President to identify a preset process for finding facts would seem 
to be valuable in itself. While the President is not very good at personally conducting investigations 
to ferret out information and find facts, she might be quite good at creating structures and processes 
for how such information ought to be investigated and collected. Moreover, having the President 
create the process might force some responsibility onto her for such decisions. Cf. Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 87 CORNELL L. 
REV. 452, 461 (2002) (“[S]ome governmental actor [must] take responsibility for the hard choices 
of regulatory policy. Responsibility in this context means articulating the standards that direct 
and cabin administrative discretion.”). 
 259. See, e.g., Paul Quirk, Presidential Competence, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL 
SYSTEM 134, 143 (Michael Nelson ed., 10th ed. 2014) (“The effort to design the best possible 
organization for presidential coordination of the executive branch is exceedingly complex and 
uncertain—fundamentally, it’s a matter of hard trade-offs and guesses, not elegant solutions.”). 
 260. As in Part II, I focus here on identifying a process for presidential powers where 
individual due process concerns are not implicated. See supra note 122. Moreover, I primarily draw 
on administrative law scholarship that addresses how to prevent arbitrary governance rather than 
focusing on scholarship that addresses how to increase accountability since the President is, at 
least formally, accountable for her decisions, and, in any event, accountability-enhancing 
measures such as notice and comment procedures are unlikely to be adopted by the President.  
 261. On benefits, see, for example, Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: 
Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2325 (2006) (“We do 
not want one supplier of information to the President; a competitive market better supplies clients 
than a monopolist.”); Rascoff, supra note 220, at 675–78 (noting benefits of information 
aggregation and harmonization); and Stephenson, supra note 11, at 1462–64. On costs, see, for 
example, Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and 
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1676–83 (2006) (discussing 
the benefits and costs of redundancy in institutional design); and Stephenson, supra note 11, at 
1464–65 (noting the limits of Condorcet Jury Theorem and the collective action free-riding 
problems when many people are involved in the same decision). On calibration, see, for example, 
O’Connell, supra, at 1683–84. 
 
Roisman_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 4/28/2019 3:17 PM 
2019] PRESIDENTIAL FACTFINDING 885 
sign off on the factfinding to ensure it was done objectively. The 
rationale, here, would be that putting the responsibility in the hands of 
one person would incentivize that person to ensure the facts were found 
reasonably.262  
Another option would be to conduct ex post review of the 
factfinding, which could take the form of an analogue to “hard look” 
review. The reviewer could require the articulation of the factual 
underpinnings of the exercise of power and ensure that all the relevant 
evidence was considered and that there was a rational connection 
between the facts found and the evidence.263 Although hard look review 
is typically done by courts, there is no reason it could not be conducted 
internally within the executive branch.264 Such review could be 
bolstered by additional record-keeping and “reason-giving” 
requirements.265 Indeed, simply requiring an internal record explicitly 
stating the facts that serve as predicates for the exercise of power and 
how they were found could be an improvement.266 The President could 
also try to make factfinding decisions more transparent by making the 
process underlying factfinding more public or by requiring increased 
reporting of factfinding decisions to Congress or the public.267 These 
options are just a sampling of prominent suggestions from the 
administrative law and institutional design literature regarding how 
best to structure executive branch decisionmaking. Surely, other 
possibilities exist,268 but the hope of this Section is to provide a 
preliminary list of options to structure such decisionmaking. 
Regardless of what the ideal structure for presidential 
factfinding is as a policy matter, factfinding review ought to be 
 
 262. See, e.g., Short, supra note 252, at 1863–64. 
 263. Cf. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 
(1983). 
 264. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial 
Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 758–59 (2006) (noting that variations of hard look review can be 
done through “non-judicial review of agency action, such as regulatory review by [OMB]”). 
 265. See, e.g., Short, supra note 252, at 1820–23 (discussing rationales behind reason-giving 
requirements); Louis J. Virelli III, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 92 N.C. L. 
REV. 721, 741–42 (2014) (discussing record-building feature of hard look review). 
 266. Cf. Gorod, supra note 12, at 77 (“If courts were forced to identify expressly the legislative 
facts on which they have relied, it might increase the likelihood that judges would not rest their 
decisions on unfounded assumptions but instead would subject their assumptions to further 
research and testing . . . .”). 
 267. There are well-known limits to transparency pushes, and they must be well-designed to 
be effective. See, e.g., Short, supra note 252, at 1846 (listing five characteristics of well-designed 
information-disclosure regulation).  
 268. For example, Matthew Stephenson has provided a methodical and sophisticated account 
of how institutional design mechanisms can spur increased information, which could also be 
incorporated into design of factfinding procedures. See Stephenson, supra note 11. 
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incorporated into existing legal review structures within the executive 
branch. As noted above, numerous existing structures within the 
executive branch seek to ensure that presidential authority is exercised 
legally, yet these structures do not appear to focus on ensuring that 
facts underlying the legal analysis were reasonably found.269 
Incorporating review of factfinding into legal review would help ensure 
that facts are found objectively and that the President abides by her 
obligations to be honest and engage in reasonable inquiry.  
As a concrete example of what a preset process might look like, 
we can return to executive orders and proclamations. The order that 
governs how executive orders and proclamations are approved, E.O. 
11030, could be amended to require that any factual findings that serve 
as predicates for authority of a proposed order be spelled out explicitly, 
in addition to the explanation of “the nature, purpose, background, and 
effect of” the proposed directive that is already required; that these 
factual findings be subject to interagency review; and that the Director 
of OMB review and sign off on the factfinding as having reasonably been 
conducted.270 In addition, or as an alternative, the order could be 
amended to make clear that the requisite “form and legality” review 
must take into account the underlying factfinding—perhaps by 
requiring OLC to sign off on its having been done reasonably. After all, 
if my claim above is correct that the President has a constitutional duty 
to be honest and engage in reasonable inquiry in finding facts that serve 
as predicates for exercises of power, this should be part of “legality” 
review in any event. In short, it is not hard to envision a system where 
factfinding becomes a normal part of systematized executive branch 
review of presidential conduct. 
Such review could apply rather straightforwardly to “Pure Fact” 
authorities, where the factual predicate is clearly stated.271 For “Mixed 
Fact and Policy” powers, where the underlying factual premises are not 
clearly stated in the relevant authority, the governing order could 
require that the factual basis for the policy judgment be stated explicitly 
 
 269. See supra notes 127, 231–235 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra notes 225–226 and accompanying text (describing current formal order 
requirements). The order could also potentially require confidence assessments be given to the 
factual claims. See infra notes 297–298 and accompanying text (discussing incorporation of 
confidence assessments into intelligence products and how such assessments could be incorporated 
into presidential factfinding). 
 271. For example, if the President wished to certify that the Palestinian Authority has not 
“taken any action with respect to the ICC that is intended to influence a determination . . . to 
initiate a judicially authorized investigation,” Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 
115-31, § 7041(l)(2), 131 Stat. 135, 667, this finding could be subject to interagency review and 
high-level sign-off before the President would make it. 
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(at least internally) and that this factual basis be subject to interagency 
review and high-level sign-off. So, for example, if a proposed order 
sought to ban the entry of certain aliens because their entry would be 
“detrimental to the interests of the United States,” then at least the 
internal paperwork would need to explain precisely why the aliens’ 
entry would be “detrimental,” and those factual predicates would be 
subject to interagency review and high-level sign-off.272  
This is not to suggest that there only be one process for all 
instances of presidential factfinding. Given the range of areas in which 
the President must find facts, one could imagine different processes and 
methods of review depending on the substantive issue area—for 
example, one process for national security, one for trade, one for 
sanctions, one for government procurement, and so on. Similarly, one 
could divide up presidential factfinding authorities based on the type of 
fact the President must find.273 At bottom, though, whether a one-size-
fits-all approach, a more nuanced substantive approach, a fact-type 
approach, or some other approach is optimal, the President ought to 
identify procedures for factfinding ex ante to avoid conducting 
factfinding in an ad hoc manner that increases the risk of arbitrary and 
illegitimate exercises of power.274 Of course, such formal preset 
procedures would not eliminate the President’s ability to manipulate 
the outcome or avoid the process entirely.275 But having default formal 
processes in place is likely to have a constraining effect by their simple 
de facto presence, which would create internal routines and structures 
that would require extra effort to avoid.276   
 
 272.  Perhaps the relevant factual findings would have confidence levels assigned to them, as 
well. See supra note 270. 
 273. For example, facts might be assessed based on how verifiable and important they are, 
with more process justified as one moves from unverifiable to verifiable and from unimportant to 
important. Cf. 3 DAVIS, supra note 12, § 15:3, at 145 (suggesting adjudicative facts deserve more 
process, in part, because they are more ascertainable); id. § 12:8, at 437 (providing five scales along 
which legislative facts can be assessed). How best to define “verifiability” and “importance” would 
no doubt be contestable and surely there are other potentially useful metrics. The point is that 
decisionmakers could evaluate particular factfinding powers on predetermined metrics to see 
where to appropriately allocate resources. That said, while a fact-type approach would be more 
nuanced, it would also provide less clear guidance ex ante and allow more room for error or 
manipulation than a more broadly applicable default process. 
 274. Cf. Gorod, supra note 12, at 73–74 (“Whatever the best procedures or guidelines might 
be, some procedures or guidelines should exist . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 275. See, e.g., HUGHES, supra note 109, at 24, 26 (noting that policymakers often cherry-pick 
intelligence or use it to support preexisting positions); MAYER, supra note 223, at 60–61 (stating 
that executive orders sometimes skip formal processes when the White House is under time 
pressure). 
 276. See supra note 252; see also Katyal, supra note 261, at 2318 (“[M]odest internal 
checks . . . , while subject to presidential override, could constrain presidential adventurism on a 
day-to-day basis.”); cf. Bruff, supra note 10, at 60 (“Although administrative officials ordinarily are 
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To be sure, such preset process would come with costs. Requiring 
formal process would make factfinding more burdensome, which could 
make it harder for the President to exercise authorities predicated on 
factfinding. This is analogous to the critiques made in the 
administrative law literature that increased procedural requirements 
lead to ossification.277 These costs must be taken seriously. However, to 
understand whether the costs outweigh the benefits, we need to know 
more about what precisely these costs are.278 And it is worth recalling 
that the alternative to having some preset process, is having no preset 
process.279 Such a lack of process might be justifiable if one believes the 
risks of arbitrary factfinding are minimal, but not if one perceives the 
risks as substantial.280 Moreover, even if costs are a primary concern, 
they might be addressed through design of the process, rather than by 
eliminating the process entirely. For example, if the concern is that 
imposing a preset process on routine, unimportant presidential 
factfinding is too onerous, one could impose a “significance” threshold 
that must be met before subjecting the factfinding to the process.281 If 
the concern is that a preset process could slow an extremely significant 
and necessary response to a disaster, one could provide exceptions for 
 
prepared to judge both the facts and the law in a fashion that is sympathetic to known presidential 
desires, there are limits to what they will approve.”); Linde, supra note 123, at 253 (“[Procedural 
design of lawmaking need not] presuppose philosopher kings elected by philosopher constituents, 
free from ignorance, sloth, gluttony, avarice, short-sightedness, political cowardice and ambition; 
quite the contrary. It undertakes to confine political irrationality by process, not what Learned 
Hand called ‘moral adjurations.’ ”); Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth”: Heightened 
Judicial Review in the Absence of Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1589, 1652 (2014): 
Expecting analysis to win a head-to-head battle with politics goes too far. Ensuring 
evidence-based decision-making subject to oversight, however, remains an effective 
prophylaxis against wanton political decision-making in the bureaucracy. While the 
specter of political manipulation cannot be ignored . . . the requisite agency findings, 
with sufficient evidentiary backing, should stymie at least purely ideological decisions. 
 277. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing 
the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493 (2012). But see, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 276, 
at 1654 (“[T]he ossification critique is not built on strong empirical foundations.”). 
 278. See Stephenson, supra note 264, at 803 (noting that it matters whether costs are socially 
important or unimportant). 
 279. Cf. Sharkey, supra note 276, at 1650 (“[T]he fact-finding burden—even if significant—is 
put into perspective when one considers the alternative, namely decisions justified by the agency’s 
say-so.”). 
 280. Cf., e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 673, 675 (2015) 
(discussing balancing costs of process against benefits of governance). 
 281. Constructing the appropriate “significance” threshold would no doubt be complex, but 
such thresholds have been constructed before. For example, only regulations that meet a defined 
“significance” threshold must go through centralized OMB review, a determination made routinely 
within the executive branch. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, § 3(f) (Sept. 30, 
1993) (defining “significant regulatory action” as an action that, inter alia, would have an annual 
effect on the economy of $100 million or more). 
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emergencies.282 In short, to the extent there are costs in implementing 
a preset process—and surely there are—they might be addressed in 
identifying which process is best, rather than in arguing for no process 
at all. Indeed, one of the virtues of regulating factfinding through 
internal executive controls is that such controls can be modified 
relatively easily by the President in light of additional information 
regarding their costs (or benefits).  
An additional objection to this endeavor is that it is fruitless, 
because the President has no reason to impose such a process on herself. 
Yet presidents limit their own authority through ex ante processes all 
the time.283 Of course, they must have some incentive to do so, but it is 
not hard to conjure such an incentive in this context. If a President 
wishes to ensure that her factfinding is done objectively—perhaps in 
response to a previous administration’s rampant disregard for 
factfinding or a particularly high-profile factfinding error—then she 
might have the incentive to impose such a structure and announce it 
publicly. Although this might not happen in the immediate future, it 
does not strike me as unrealistic, and it only becomes more realistic the 
more such a process is discussed and lauded.  
In short, although it is difficult to construct the perfect process 
for the President to conduct factfinding, there is good reason to think 
that some ex ante process is desirable. Given the breadth and import of 
presidential factfinding authorities, how the President finds facts is too 
important to leave to the whim of the moment. 
2. Certainty 
The next area of inquiry is into what standard of certainty the 
President ought to apply to factfinding. We generally have no idea how 
certain the President must be before she finds a fact authorizing her to 
exert power. This is not to say that the President does not apply a 
standard of certainty. To the contrary, it is logically necessary for her 
to do so. As Gary Lawson has stated, “For any given proposition in any 
 
282. Cf. Bruff, supra note 10, at 58 (“Because orderly bureaucratic procedure takes time, any 
legal prerequisites to presidential decision must allow for response to emergencies. There are times 
when the President needs to exercise his statutory powers on very short notice.”). 
 283. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and 
External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 433 (2009) (“Presidents frequently support 
imposition of internal mechanisms that substantially constrain the Executive Branch and even 
sometimes adopt such measures voluntarily . . . .”); Jon D. Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered 
Executive: Presidential Spinoffs in National Security Domains and Beyond, 97 VA. L. REV. 801 
(2011) (evaluating instances where the executive branch, including the President, relinquished 
control through institutional redesign, and discussing why might be incentivized to do so). 
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given context, one needs a standard of proof that expresses the total 
weight or magnitude of the evidence required for a justified assertion of 
that proposition.”284 The choice is thus not between having a standard 
of certainty and not having one, it is between identifying a standard of 
certainty and not identifying one. To date, with very limited exception, 
the President has failed to do so.285 
Once we recognize this state of affairs, it seems fairly easy to 
critique it. We know from many areas of law that the standard of 
certainty factfinders apply can be dispositive of whether or not they find 
relevant facts.286 This is fairly intuitive. If the President only needs to 
determine, for example, that she has “reasonable suspicion” that use of 
force will preserve “regional stability” before using military force, then 
she has vastly more discretion than if she needs to determine that she 
is “nearly certain” that this is the case. Choosing the appropriate level 
of certainty can thus be determinative of whether the authority in 
question can be used. Indeed, identifying the standard of certainty is 
perhaps particularly important in the presidential factfinding context 
given the coordination within the executive branch that must take place 
for the President to find facts.287  
The applicable standard of certainty is thus undoubtedly 
important. So, what should it be? The literature on how to identify 
optimal standards of certainty is immense.288 The conventional 
approach is to calculate the costs of false positives and false negatives 
and derive the standard of certainty from there.289 The basic intuition 
 
 284. Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 870 (1992) (“[S]ome standard of 
proof—whether cardinal or ordinal, explicit or implicit—must be operative, or no conclusion, 
including ‘I don’t know,’ can rationally be advanced.”); cf. Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, 
Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 557, 558 (2013). 
 285. I am only aware of one instance in which the President has publicly identified a standard 
of certainty, and that is President Obama’s release of a report explaining that a “near certainty” 
standard applied to certain targeted-killing determinations. W.H. REPORT, supra note 50, at 25. 
 286. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Traditional Probability, Relative Plausibility, or 
Belief Function?, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 353, 354 (2015) (“The different standards of proof 
determine outcome. Empirical proof supports that point . . . .”); Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 
YALE L.J. 738, 741 (2012) (“The stringency of the proof burden determines how error is 
allocated . . . .”).  
 287. Failure to identify the appropriate standard will affect both what sorts of information will 
be collected by executive branch actors and the ability of anyone to effectively review the 
factfinding. Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Evidentiary Standards and Information Acquisition in 
Public Law, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 351 (2008) (stating that setting an evidentiary standard can 
affect incentives to acquire information). 
 288. See, e.g., Allen & Stein, supra note 284, at 559–60 (collecting sources); Mark Spottswood, 
The Hidden Structure of Fact-Finding, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 131, 143–52 (2013) (same). 
 289. See, e.g., John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 
1065, 1071 (1968); Dale A. Nance, Evidential Completeness and the Burden of Proof, 49 HASTINGS 
L.J. 621, 622 (1998) (“The now conventional understanding of the burden of proof is that the level 
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is that the higher the cost of false positives relative to the cost of false 
negatives, the higher the standard of certainty should be.290 How 
precisely the calculation should be conducted is subject to rigorous 
debate.291 In fact, this probabilistic method has itself come under 
sustained critique by scholars who argue that people find facts not 
through probabilistic models but by constructing and comparing 
“stories” or “narratives.”292 Given the complex nature of these questions, 
identifying the optimal standard must lie outside the scope of this 
Section. The point, for now, is to establish that this is a fruitful line of 
inquiry. Standards of certainty matter, and it is remarkable that we do 
not know what the President’s standards of certainty are or should be 
for finding facts.  
Some might argue that identifying standards of certainty should 
be done on an ad hoc basis in the context of particular decisions rather 
than ex ante. Although one cannot reject this claim categorically, such 
an approach risks losing the benefits of ex ante processes noted above 
and playing into general risks of politicized or emergency factfinding 
and their attendant biases.293 And in any event, even if some authorities 
may call for ad hoc certainty standards, surely many will not.294 
 
or weight of the burden of persuasion is determined by the expected utilities associated with 
correct and incorrect alternative decisions.”); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370–71 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring): 
If, for example, the standard of proof for a criminal trial were a preponderance of the 
evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, there would be a smaller risk of 
factual errors that result in freeing guilty persons, but a far greater risk of factual errors 
that result in convicting the innocent. Because the standard of proof affects the 
comparative frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes, the choice of the 
standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation should, in a rational world, 
reflect an assessment of the comparative social disutility of each.  
 290. For example, this explains the higher standard for guilty verdicts in criminal proceedings 
(beyond a reasonable doubt) than for civil verdicts (preponderance of the evidence). The cost of a 
false positive (convicting an innocent person) is thought to be substantially higher than the cost of 
a false negative (acquitting a guilty person) in the criminal context but not so in the civil context. 
 291. See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L.J. 1254 
(2013) (refining existing formulas); Kaplow, supra note 286; Fredrick E. Vars, Toward a General 
Theory of Standards of Proof, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2010) (critiquing the conventional 
formula and proposing a new one). 
 292. See, e.g., Allen & Stein, supra note 284, at 570; Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, 
Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 LAW & PHIL. 223, 224 (2008) (“In this essay, we 
attempt to . . . demonstrate that the process of inference to the best explanation itself best explains 
both the macro-structure of proof at trial and the micro-level issues regarding the relevance and 
value of particular items of evidence.”). 
 293. See Christina E. Wells, Questioning Deference, 69 MO. L. REV. 903, 908 (2004) (“In times 
of crisis, government actors can err by misperceiving that certain groups pose a danger or by acting 
on the erroneous perceptions of others.”). 
 294. Cf. Michael S. Pardo, Second-Order Proof Rules, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1083, 1090–91 (2009) 
(rejecting ad hoc approach for litigation). 
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Although the difficulty in constructing a standard of certainty might 
lead some to wonder if the game is worth the candle,295 it is worth 
remembering that the President is already applying a standard of 
certainty when he finds facts.296 It is just not clear (perhaps, even to 
him) what it is. 
If identifying definitive standards of certainty is too onerous, 
another possibility would be to require stated levels of confidence 
regarding the President’s factual determinations. This would mirror 
reforms implemented in the intelligence community following the 
intelligence failures leading to the Iraq War.297 One of the key 
recommendations made by the Iraq Review Group was that “in all 
future major intelligence products, analysts be required to include a 
thorough assessment and explicit statement regarding their level of 
confidence in the judgments expressed.”298 It is not clear why this 
innovation should be limited to intelligence products. Thus, even if the 
President does not wish to identify preset standards of certainty, she 
might still require internal statements of levels of confidence, which 
would give her more information and likely have the effect of 
disciplining, or at least clarifying, internal decisionmaking.  
B. Congressional Regulation of Presidential Factfinding 
Congress could also seek to regulate presidential factfinding 
procedurally. Congress already does this sometimes when it confers 
factfinding power on the President. At times, Congress requires the 
President to notify Congress or certain committees of the President’s 
determination,299 to compile and submit a factual record or the 
 
 295. Cf. Vars, supra note 291, at 3 (“One might throw up one’s hands at this point, but that 
would be a mistake. Courts and legislators must select standards under conditions of imperfect 
information, and the outcomes of real cases hang in the balance.”). 
 296. See supra note 284 and accompanying text. 
 297. See MORELL & HARLOW, supra note 239, at 102: 
[B]y far the biggest mistake made by the analysts . . . was not that they came to the 
wrong conclusion about Iraq’s WMD program, but rather that they did not rigorously 
ask themselves how confident they were in those judgments. . . . [H]ad the analysts at 
the time thoughtfully and rigorously asked themselves how confident they 
were . . . they would most likely have said, “Not very.” That would have been a very 
different message to the president and other policymakers and potentially could have 
affected their policy decision. 
 298. Id. at 103.  
 299. See, e.g., 14 U.S.C. § 665(b) (2012) (prohibition on shipbuilding in foreign yards can be 
waived by a presidential determination that must be transmitted to Congress thirty days prior to 
taking effect); 21 U.S.C. § 1903(g)(2) (2012) (“When the President determines not to apply 
sanctions that are authorized by this chapter to any significant foreign narcotics trafficker, the 
President shall notify the [relevant congressional committees] not later than 21 days after making 
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underlying reasons for the determination,300 or to publish the finding in 
the Federal Register or through executive order or proclamation.301 
Some authorities also require that the President either consult with 
certain actors or consider certain factors in making the relevant 
determination.302 If it wished, Congress could bolster such procedural 
requirements by adding more requirements to particular authorities or 
by passing a framework statute governing presidential factfinding in 
general. However, to determine the appropriate approach for how 
 
such determination.”); 22 U.S.C. § 6301(f)(2) (2012) (“If the President decides to exercise the waiver 
authority [regarding sanctions], the President shall so notify the Congress not less than 20 days 
before the waiver takes effect.”); 22 U.S.C.A. § 9524(c) (West 2019) (stating that certain sanctions 
can be waived only if the President submits particular determinations to relevant congressional 
committees). 
 300. For example, see 15 U.S.C. § 713d-1(a) (2012), which states that when President 
determines there is critical shortage of certain materials or products that “jeopardizes the health 
or safety of the people of the United States or its national security or welfare,” he may propose 
conservation measures of such materials or products, “which he shall submit to the Congress in 
the following form:” including “[a] statement of the circumstances which, in the President’s 
judgment, require the proposed conservation measures” and “[a] complete record of the factual 
evidence upon which his recommendations are based, including all information provided by any 
agency of the Federal Government which may have been made available to him in the course of 
his consideration of the matter.” See also, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824o-1 (2012) (stating that when the 
President provides a particular directive identifying a “grid security emergency,” he shall inform 
the relevant congressional committees of “the contents of, and justification for, such directive or 
determination”); 22 U.S.C. § 6301(f)(2) (stating that notification to Congress of sanctions waiver 
“shall include a report fully articulating the rationale and circumstances which led the President 
to exercise the waiver authority”). 
 301. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2459(a) (2012) (requiring notice of presidential determination that 
cultural artifacts are of “cultural significance” and removed from judicial jurisdiction be published 
in Federal Register); 26 U.S.C. § 993(c)(3) (2012) (“If the President determines that the supply of 
any [export] property described in paragraph (1) is insufficient to meet the requirements of the 
domestic economy, he may by Executive order designate the property as in short supply.”); 41 
U.S.C. § 6305 (2012) (“Each determination of need by the President under this subparagraph shall 
be published in the Federal Register.”); see also 21 U.S.C. § 1903(b) (2012) (requiring annual report 
to certain congressional committees “identifying publicly the foreign persons that the President 
determines are appropriate for sanctions pursuant to this chapter”).  
 302. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1981(c)(1)(A) (2012) (“Any increase in, or imposition of, any 
duty . . . may be reduced or terminated by the President when he determines, after taking into 
account the advice received from the United States International Trade Commission . . . and after 
seeking advice of the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Labor, that such reduction or 
termination is in the national interest.”); 50 U.S.C. § 4611 (2012) (“The President . . . shall apply 
sanctions . . . if the President determines that [a foreign person’s violation of export 
controls] . . . has resulted in substantial enhancement of Soviet and East bloc [military] 
capabilities . . . as determined by the President, on the advice of the National Security Council, to 
represent a serious adverse impact on the strategic balance of forces.”); 12 U.S.C. § 1706c(a) (2012) 
(providing that an agency can increase mortgage insurance if the President determines the 
increase to be in the “public interest” after “taking into account the general effect of any such 
increase upon conditions in the building industry and upon the national economy”); 22 U.S.C. § 
2151t(b) (2012) (“In making loans” to promote the economic development of certain countries, “the 
President shall consider the economic circumstances of the borrower and other relevant factors, 
including the capacity of the recipient country to repay the loan at a reasonable rate of 
interest . . . .”). 
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Congress ought to regulate factfinding, we would need a more 
comprehensive and detailed analysis of precisely when and how 
Congress currently regulates presidential factfinding, as well as an 
assessment of the constitutional issues raised by Congress’s regulation 
of internal executive branch decisionmaking delegated to the 
President.303 Given the complexity of these questions, a fuller 
elaboration of how Congress currently does and ought to regulate 
presidential factfinding will have to wait for another day. 
C. Judicial Review of Presidential Factfinding 
The next question is how judicial review of presidential 
factfinding ought to be structured. Before discussing this issue, it is 
worth emphasizing the inherent limits of judicial review as a method of 
policing presidential factfinding. Because so many exercises of 
presidential factfinding will not impact individuals in a way that 
confers standing, a great deal of presidential factfinding will not be 
regulated by judicial review.304 Thus, judicial review alone will never be 
a fully satisfying method of regulating presidential factfinding. That 
said, there will be times when exercises of factfinding authority are 
subject to judicial review, and such review is thus a key part of the 
enforcement regime.  
Constructing appropriate judicial review in the context of 
presidential factfinding is a difficult enterprise. Judicial review is 
meant to ensure that the President is complying with the law—here, to 
honestly and reasonably find facts—but courts are understandably 
wary of substituting their judgment for the President’s given the 
President’s perceived institutional advantages.305 An appropriate mode 
of judicial review will seek to balance these competing considerations.  
 
 303. Cf. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992); Bruff, supra note 10, at 23–24 
(suggesting that applying the APA to the President would raise constitutional concerns); Adrian 
Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1223 (2013) (noting the 
Court’s reluctance to find that statutes regulate the President “in view of the resulting 
constitutional questions about executive power”). Indeed, even if Congress’s regulation of statutory 
factfinding is unproblematic—as it may well be—regulation of the President’s constitutional 
factfinding powers would raise thornier issues. 
 304. See supra note 17. 
 305. As discussed in Part II, I focus here on ensuring the President abides by her first-order 
obligations, separate and apart from what individual rights might require in particular instances. 
See supra note 122.  
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Courts typically defer to presidential authority because of the 
President’s relative accountability and epistemic advantages.306 
However, neither of these comparative institutional advantages ought 
to be assumed to be present in the context of presidential factfinding. 
Although the President is, of course, more directly accountable than 
judges, it is not clear that she is accountable for her factfinding. As 
noted above, the public will have a uniquely hard time holding the 
President accountable for factfinding, and even if it could hold the 
President accountable, it is not clear we would want the President to 
find facts based on how popular they might be.307 For these reasons, it 
is important to be careful before deferring to presidential factfinding 
authorities on accountability grounds. That said, there might be some 
decisions predicated on factfinding that are sufficiently important that 
we would want the President to make them based on an accountability 
rationale. Factfinding authorities for use of force, for example, might be 
justified on this ground. So, while caution should be used before 
deferring to presidential factfinding on an accountability rationale, one 
cannot entirely rule it out. 
The next rationale for judicial deference to presidential 
factfinding is based on the President’s relative epistemic advantages 
over courts. The President surely has access to more information than 
judges and thus has the capacity to find facts more accurately than 
courts.308 But as noted above, just because the President has access to 
information within the executive branch does not mean that she will 
always be motivated to use it to objectively find facts.309 Indeed, greater 
access to information also creates the ability to better cherry-pick 
information to arrive at a preordained outcome.310  
In short, although the President is more directly politically 
accountable than the courts, she will not necessarily be accountable for 
her factfinding. And although the President has the capacity for 
epistemic advantage, she will not always use that capacity. This calls 
for caution before courts defer based on these rationales. That said, 
there may be situations where accountability and epistemic advantages 
justify deference to exercises of presidential factfinding powers. The key 
 
 306. See, e.g., Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision 
Making, 98 IOWA L. REV. 465, 479 (2013); Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1061, 1078–90 (2008); cf. Chesney, supra note 10, at 1434–35. 
 307. See supra notes 240–248 and accompanying text. 
 308. See generally Sunstein, supra note 163. 
 309. See supra notes 240–248 and accompanying text. 
 310. Cf. WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT 
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 103 (2003) (suggesting that because presidents have better access to 
information, they “can tailor their presentation of facts in ways that strengthen their position”). 
 
Roisman_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 4/28/2019 3:17 PM 
896 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:3:825 
is balancing the need for judicial review with the need to appropriately 
defer to the President in such instances. Below, I propose three 
potential approaches that seek to balance these concerns in different 
ways: process-based deference, hard look review, and contextual 
deference. I explain each approach’s benefits and costs and conclude 
with the preliminary suggestion that process-based deference is likely 
the most realistic, desirable starting point.311  
1. Process-Based Deference 
The first potential approach to judicial review would be a form 
of process-based deference.312 Under this approach, courts would 
increase deference to the relevant factfinding when the President 
establishes that she used rigorous, internal executive process to find 
facts and decrease deference when she has not.313 This could be done, 
for example, by “requiring the executive branch to provide an express 
account of the decisionmaking process that produced the factual 
judgment.”314  
The basic intuition behind this form of judicial review is clear.315 
By increasing deference when the President establishes the factfinding 
was conducted using a rigorous internal process and ratcheting down 
 
 311. This Section addresses how courts ought to review presidential factfinding that is subject 
to judicial review but brackets many technical questions about how such review might come about 
or what remedies might be available. For an interesting account of how to deal with some of the 
key threshold, standard of review, and remedies questions in judicial review of presidential orders, 
more broadly, see Manheim & Watts, supra note 17 (manuscript at 61–86). 
 312. The term “deference” is famously slippery. Horwitz, supra note 306, at 1072. Here, I adopt 
Paul Horwitz’s definition that “deference involves a decisionmaker following a determination made 
by some other individual or institution that it might not otherwise have reached had it decided the 
same question independently.” Id.  
 313. Such an approach has been called for by several scholars in a range of areas. See, e.g., 
Berger, supra note 306, at 498, 505; Chesney, supra note 10, at 1419; Larsen, supra note 12, at 
182, 234–35 (suggesting approach whereby “courts are tasked with evaluating the process used to 
generate the factual claims presented” and the “more complete the process behind the factual 
statement, the greater deference should be due”); Renan, supra note 177, at 2256–62 (suggesting 
“indirect enforcement” of presidential norms could be implemented by ratcheting down deference 
when the President has not abided by the “deliberative presidency” norm); Sharkey, supra note 
276, at 1592; see also Manheim & Watts, supra note 17 (manuscript at 57) (“As a practical 
matter, . . . the lack of procedural constraints governing the issuance of presidential orders—and, 
in particular, a President’s decision to dispense with intra-executive processes, such as internal 
legal review—may well encourage a court to review the substance of a presidential order with a 
more skeptical eye.”). This approach also seemed to underlie the Supreme Court’s ruling in Trump 
v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018), and has analogues in administrative law, where more process 
often garners agencies more deference. See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 12, at 234–40. 
 314. Chesney, supra note 10, at 1419.  
 315. Cf. Horwitz, supra note 306, at 1101 (“[T]o the extent that judicial deference . . . is based 
on [an institution’s] epistemic superiority, we should oblige such an institution to actually bring 
the weight of its expertise to bear on the problem before the court.”). 
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deference when it was not, this form of review would incentivize the 
President to use more rigorous process ex ante, thereby taking 
advantage of her epistemic advantages. Of course, such an approach is 
no panacea. The executive branch would have incentives to paint its 
internal process in the most favorable light,316 and the President could 
still reach an inaccurate result even after using a rigorous process. But 
by incentivizing a more rigorous process, process-based review would 
likely encourage more accurate factfinding in the mine run of cases.317 
Moreover, courts are quite practiced in examining process—at least 
relative to examining substantive policy decisions—and thus such 
review would not seem to lie outside realistic judicial competence.318 
Finally, it is worth noting that deference in this context need not be 
“absolute.”319 The court might only defer “up to a point,” but still be 
willing to respect presidential findings of fact that the court would not 
have made on its own.320  
In short, a process-based deference approach would help 
incentivize the President to use her epistemic advantages in finding 
facts, while avoiding strict scrutiny of the ultimate policy or factual 
determination that the investigation enabled.  
2. Hard Look Review 
Another approach would be to apply a variant of administrative 
law’s “hard look” review to presidential factfinding.321 Although hard 
look review currently only applies to agency decisionmaking, several 
scholars have argued it should apply to presidential decisionmaking in 
 
 316. See Chesney, supra note 10, at 1419 (recognizing that the benefits of this form of judicial 
review “should not be overstated” and that executive branch “[d]eclarations no doubt would cast 
underlying decisionmaking processes in the best possible light, perhaps at substantial variance 
with events as they actually unfolded on the ground”). 
 317. This approach might complement Kevin Stack’s proposal that presidential 
determinations, including factual determinations, forming the predicate of exercises of statutory 
authority ought to be subject to ultra vires review. Stack, Reviewability, supra note 10, at 1201–
02. Stack clarifies that such review ought to be deferential but does not specify what deference 
ought to apply. Id. at 1207. Process-based deference would be one option.  
 318. See, e.g., 3 DAVIS, supra note 12, § 29:17, at 407–09; Larsen, supra note 12, at 237 (noting 
that “judges are good at evaluating process” and that this type of review “is not that far afield from 
other questions that are part of the judicial homework already”). 
 319. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 306, at 1073. 
 320. Id. At which “point” to draw the line, of course, could be highly contestable. Cf. Larsen, 
supra note 12, at 202–18, 235 (providing examples of “alternative facts” that are “easily rebutted” 
or “simply untrue”). 
 321. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983) 
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certain contexts.322 Hard look review could be translated to the context 
of presidential factfinding by perhaps requiring that the President 
clearly state the factual findings underpinning her exercise of power, 
establish that she considered all the relevant evidence, and articulate a 
rational connection between the ultimate factual finding and that 
evidence.323  
The benefits of hard look review are fairly well known: It would 
incentivize the President to ensure the process underlying the 
factfinding was reasonably constructed and considered the relevant 
information.324 It would impose greater scrutiny than process-based 
deference, in that it would require a formal articulation of the 
connection between the ultimate determination and the evidence and 
would include some substantive review of the ultimate determination 
to ensure it was rationally connected to the underlying evidence.325 
Moreover, by requiring an articulation of the basis of the decision, it 
would also increase the chance that the public could hold the President 
accountable for particular determinations.326 Hard look review would 
also, however, have well-known costs. Critics often point to hard look 
review’s potential to “ossify” policymaking and argue that it can raise 
separation of powers and judicial competence problems by permitting 
inexpert judges to substitute their judgment for that of expert executive 
branch officials.327 These critiques have their conventional responses in 
 
 322. See, e.g., Driesen, supra note 10, at 1066 (arguing that extending arbitrary and capricious 
review to statutory presidential policymaking “supports the rule of law and serves constitutional 
values”); Masur, supra note 10, at 492 (arguing that “[n]o principled line exists to confine hard 
look review to the domain of administrative agencies”); cf. Manheim & Watts, supra note 17 
(manuscript at 76) (calling for a more deferential form of “arbitrariness” review, pursuant to which 
“the President would be required to set forth a non-arbitrary justification in the text of his orders 
themselves” and a court would uphold the order “so long as the decisional factors that the President 
relied upon were not legally foreclosed” and “any factual justifications had adequate support”). 
 323. Cf. Driesen, supra note 10, at 1060 (“Arbitrary and capricious review of presidential 
decisionmaking should aim to detect evasion of the legislative purpose” by requiring “some factual 
support for a decision and a rationale linking the decision to the statutory policies.”).  
 324. See Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“The 
function of the court is to assure that the agency has given reasoned consideration to all the 
material facts and issues.”).  
 325. Of course, how rigorous hard look review is and ought to be is a matter of debate. See, 
e.g., Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1360 
(2016) (arguing for “thin” rationality review both descriptively and prescriptively). 
 326. See Bruff, supra note 10, at 59 (“[F]rom the standpoint of the President’s political 
accountability to Congress and the public, a requirement that he reveal his rationale for a decision 
clearly is preferable to a system that would allow him to select an option without explanation, 
leaving all concerned to speculate on the reasons for it.”).  
 327. See, e.g., Sitaraman, supra note 154, at 501–05 (noting critiques of hard look review).  
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the administrative law literature as well.328 Where one comes out on the 
normative desirability of such review will thus depend on how one 
balances these and other potential benefits and costs.  
3. Contextual Deference 
Another way to structure judicial review of presidential 
factfinding is more ad hoc. Rather than a one-size-fits-all form of 
review, this approach would seek to evaluate each individual exercise 
of authority to determine whether the reasons typically thought to 
justify deference are present and to calibrate deference accordingly. The 
basic logic underlying this contextual approach is that judicial 
deference ought to be constructed in a nuanced way to harmonize the 
reasons warranting deference and the function of judicial review.329   
Applying this approach to presidential factfinding means that 
deference would be calibrated on several dimensions. First, the 
reviewing court would evaluate whether the factfinding at issue is 
likely to be legitimately premised on an epistemic or accountability 
rationale. If so, deference would increase on this metric; if not, it would 
decrease. In particular, the court might evaluate the type of factfinding 
authority at issue to see if it is likely to be subject to epistemic or 
accountability advantages. This evaluation might lead the court to, for 
example, provide less deference for facts that are more verifiable and 
more deference for facts that are less verifiable.330 On this account, 
retrospective facts might, on balance, receive less deference, because 
they are typically more verifiable and less likely to be subject to 
epistemic or accountability advantages, whereas prospective facts 
might receive more deference, because they are typically less verifiable 
and more likely to be infused with policy judgments reliant on epistemic 
and accountability advantages.331 Assessing fact types would be more 
 
 328. See, e.g., id. at 506 (summarizing debate). In this context, ossification might be of less 
concern than in the administrative law context because costly notice and comment proceedings 
would not be implemented or enforced. Cf. id. at 527–28 (noting that not requiring notice and 
comment procedures can mitigate ossification concerns). 
 329. See, e.g., Araiza, supra note 28, at 930, 957 (suggesting such an approach for deference to 
congressional factfinding); Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative 
Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029 (2011) (suggesting approach 
for review of agency action in constitutional cases); Chesney, supra note 10, at 1430 (suggesting a 
similar approach for national security fact deference). 
 330. See, e.g., Araiza, supra note 28, at 908–09 (suggesting that “evaluative facts” that are less 
verifiable than “empirical facts” call for greater judicial deference). 
 331. See Araiza, supra note 28, at 908–09; Chesney, supra note 10, at 1410, 1430. Similarly, 
on balance, facts relating to past conduct of particular individuals would receive less deference 
than facts relating to general phenomena in the world, as specific, individualized facts are more 
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straightforward for Pure Fact powers and Mixed Fact and Policy powers 
where the factual predicates are clearly laid out, but where the factual 
underpinnings of Mixed Fact and Policy powers are hard to separate 
from the policy judgment, more deference would likely be justified.332 
Finally, the reviewing court might also evaluate the substantive issue 
to determine if there is some additional reason to defer to the President 
(perhaps because a core exclusive authority was at issue) or to avoid 
deference (perhaps because of pathologies suggesting the President 
would be unlikely to find facts objectively in the relevant context).333 
These sliding deference scales would serve as rules of thumb—the 
general idea being that the court would evaluate each exercise of a 
factfinding authority on these different dimensions and carefully 
calibrate deference appropriately.334  
This approach has the benefit of being the most nuanced. But 
this virtue is also its vice. The complexity of the inquiry raises 
significant concerns about whether courts could effectively conduct it. 
Moreover, given the ad hoc nature of the inquiry, the President might 
be uncertain ex ante what sort of deference she would receive, which 
might unjustifiably decrease (or increase) the incentive to ensure 
rigorous process was used in the factfinding in question. Finally, there 
are likely to be areas where the different metrics point in different 
directions. For example, to the extent accountability is premised on the 
public effectively overseeing presidential factfinding, this justification 
might be least appropriate in the foreign affairs and national security 
context, where the public has relatively little access to the relevant 
information, warranting less deference. But these authorities may be 
most likely to implicate the President’s particular epistemic 
advantages, warranting more deference. Yet it is not clear what the 
court should do when these rationales conflict. These tensions are not 
necessarily irreconcilable,335 but the complexity of the framework ought 
to give us pause. Although this approach may be the most nuanced, it 
would also likely be the most difficult to implement.  
 
likely to be empirically verifiable than such general facts. See, e.g., 3 DAVIS, supra note 12, § 15:3, 
at 145. 
 332. Cf. 3 DAVIS, supra note 12, § 15:10, at 179 (suggesting less evidence is needed for 
“judgmental facts”).  
 333. Cf. Araiza supra note 28, at 902 (discussing substantive dimension of congressional 
factfinding review). 
 334. See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 10, at 1411. 
 335. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 329, at 2082 (suggesting deference in such cases would “often 
be in the middle—neither especially rigorous nor especially forgiving”). 
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*      *      * 
Above, I have set forth three potential approaches for judicial 
review of presidential factfinding. The different approaches have 
distinct benefits and costs. The process-based approach is likely to 
incentivize the President to use her epistemic advantages in finding 
facts, but because it would not meaningfully substantively evaluate the 
ultimate determination, it would leave substantial room for 
presidential discretion (and potentially abuse). The hard look approach 
would also incentivize the use of process but would in addition require 
some sort of reason-giving and potentially apply a more rigorous form 
of substantive review. But this form of review would impose more 
burdens on the President and might create greater danger of courts 
illegitimately substituting their views for the President’s where the 
authority is validly justified on expertise or accountability rationales. 
The contextual approach would seek to carefully calibrate deference to 
match the presence or absence of the President’s advantages in finding 
particular facts. But this nuanced approach would create greater room 
for error and judicial manipulation, as well as less clear ex ante 
incentives for the President to engage in a rigorous factfinding process. 
Determining which form of judicial review is optimal is thus a complex 
endeavor that will depend on one’s calculations of the relative weights 
of these benefits and costs.  
Because I do not have space to fully assess these costs and 
benefits, my recommendation is necessarily preliminary. But, at least 
as a preliminary matter, process-based deference seems like the most 
desirable, realistic starting point. Process-based deference would have 
the benefit of encouraging the President to use her epistemic 
advantages in order to receive deference to her factual findings. 
Although, such an approach would impose some costs on the President’s 
decisionmaking, those costs do not seem overly onerous in relation to 
the benefits of the increased rigor within the executive branch that such 
deference would incentivize.336 Indeed, given that much of the deference 
in this context is predicated on the President’s epistemic advantages, it 
seems not too much to ask that those advantages be utilized before 
deferring.  
Some might be disappointed that process-based review would 
not engage in sufficiently rigorous substantive review of the factual 
determination. But the question in these cases will always be one of 
degree. Unless one wishes that courts find presidential facts de novo, 
 
 336. Cf. Bruff, supra note 10, at 46 (noting costs of certain process would be “tolerable, 
although they are not insignificant” in light of benefits). 
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then some amount of deference will be required. Although the 
accommodation under process-based deference is certainly not perfect, 
it seems like a reasonable compromise to begin with. And it is worth 
remembering that process-based deference would still leave room for 
reversal of extreme examples of faulty factfinding. Such deference need 
only be “up to a point.”337 
Proponents of a hard look approach might be particularly 
disappointed, but whatever its merits, hard look review seems 
unrealistic in the short term. This form of review has not been required 
of the President in modern times, and the Court recently cast serious 
doubt on its use in the Travel Ban ruling.338 That said, for proponents 
of hard look review, process-based deference might be a step in the right 
direction. Although it would not require the President to formally 
articulate a rationale connecting the evidence to the factual 
determination, it would serve many of the same functions of 
incentivizing internal process that hard look review seeks to serve.339 
Moreover, if process-based deference is used in any sort of systematic 
fashion without great harmful effect, it might soften some of the 
ossification objections to hard look review. Similarly, process-based 
deference might be able to adopt some of the insights from the 
contextual approach while limiting some of its downsides by, for 
example, reviewing more verifiable facts more closely than less 
verifiable facts without becoming fully ad hoc.  
Unfortunately, there is no perfect solution for how courts ought 
to review presidential factfinding. What seems desirable is that some 
 
 337. See Larsen, supra note 12, at 235 (such deference could still “sniff out” easily rebuttable 
false “facts”).  
 338. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2409 (2018) (describing as “questionable” the 
notion that the President is required to “explain [his relevant] . . . finding with sufficient detail to 
enable judicial review”). It is not clear whether the Court would think of the requirement 
differently outside of the national security context, but its tone certainly casts doubt on the 
likelihood of it sanctioning a general form of hard look review for presidential exercises of authority 
in the near future. Id.; see also Manheim & Watts, supra note 17 (manuscript at 75): 
It would be difficult for the courts to apply a robust form of arbitrary-and-capricious 
review (akin to hard look review) to presidential orders without also effectively 
demanding more of the Presidents who are issuing those orders: perhaps technocratic 
justifications, or detailed records, or more. These de facto requirements could, in turn, 
raise serious separation-of-powers concerns; the judiciary might be seen as 
impermissibly micromanaging the President’s decisionmaking process or otherwise 
compromising the Constitution’s separation of powers. 
 339. Cf. Larsen, supra note 12, at 235 (suggesting the basic idea behind both forms of review 
is that “when more process is used beforehand we can assume the decision will be better and thus 
it is more worthy of deference”).  
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coherent approach be used in reviewing presidential factfinding.340 To 
date, no such approach has emerged. Hopefully this discussion will help 
to spur one.  
At bottom, though, it is worth remembering that judicial review 
is only one piece of the puzzle. The vast majority of power exercised 
pursuant to presidential factfinding is unlikely to be subject to judicial 
review. So, while judicial review is important, it cannot, on its own, 
ensure that the President abides by her positive and normatively 
desirable obligations in finding facts. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1939, then-Attorney General, and later Supreme Court 
Justice, Frank Murphy wrote: “The right to take specific action might 
not exist under one state of facts, while under another it might be the 
absolute duty of the Executive to take such action.”341 In short, facts 
matter. Presidential factfinding pervades nearly every substantive 
domain of presidential power, and how it is done can make the 
difference between the President having power and lacking it. Yet, 
despite the extensive literature on presidential power, scholars have 
failed to focus on this feature. This Article submits that this is a 
mistake. To put it simply, we cannot understand the scope of the 
President’s power if we do not understand how she finds facts.  
In this Article, I have sought to address the most pressing issues 
raised by presidential factfinding by establishing how pervasive the 
phenomenon is, identifying the President’s existing legal obligations in 
finding facts, and making progress in figuring out how presidential 
factfinding ought to be regulated. But many projects remain. For 
example, we still lack a full account of how the President currently finds 
facts, and certainly more progress can be made in identifying how she 
ought to do so. And going forward, we ought to incorporate questions 
about how the President does or ought to find facts into debates about 
the scope of the President’s power that have thus far largely revolved 
around determining which facts authorize her to act. Switching from 
the President to Congress, future work might help us better understand 
why Congress delegates factfinding power specifically to the President 
rather than administrative agencies at all, as well as when such 
delegations are normatively desirable. Relatedly, recognizing that the 
 
 340.  Cf. Manheim & Watts, supra note 17 (manuscript at 7, 52–53) (noting the need for a 
“cohesive framework to guide judicial review of presidential orders,” which would help decrease 
uncertainty and inconsistency and increase the quality of judicial review). 
 341. Request of the Senate for an Opinion as to the Powers of the President “In Emergency or 
State of War,” 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 343, 347–48 (1939). 
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President is a factfinder might open up new lines of inquiry into 
factfinding across the branches. Congress, courts, agencies, and, we 
now know, the President all regularly find facts, but we lack an account 
of how factfinding is or ought to be allocated among these actors. While 
this Article certainly cannot address all the projects raised by the 
phenomenon of presidential factfinding, the hope is to spur scholarly 
interest in doing so. The President is a factfinder. We should start 
treating her that way.  
 
 
